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VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS AS A
DEFENSE IN CIVIL ACTIONS
By WILLIAM B. LOCKHART*

T

HREE Supreme Court decisions in the current term have raised
anew the question as to when violation of the federal anti-trust
laws will bar the violator who seeks judicial aid to enforce legal
"rights."'
The problem may take many forms, but basically they all come
down to this- A plaintiff comes into court to enforce what on its
face is a simple legal right. He brings an action on an unpaid
note, or on an account for the price of goods sold, or for damages
for breach of a contract to buy or sell goods, or to enjoin infringement of a patent or trade-mark. May the defendant defeat such an
action by showing that the plaintiff's "right" is so connected with
his violation of the anti-trust laws that to grant the relief sought
will assist the plaintiff in his illegal practices or in reaping its
fruits ?
This defense has been raised with stubborn persistence for fifty
years 2 despite the narrow limits within which the courts confined
it. This persistence began to bear fruit in the field of patent litigation in 1942.3 The decisions in the current term of the Court possibly suggest increased liberality toward the defense in other fields
as well, 4 and the latest decision adopts a refreshingly pragmatic
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'Katzinger v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., (1947) 67 S. Ct. 416, MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., (1947) 67 S. Ct. 421 Bruce's

Juices v. American Can Co., (1947) 67 S. Ct. 1015. In the MacGregor and
Bruce's Jices case the Court divided equally in the last term of Court and
ordered
re-argument before the full bench. See (1946) 66 S. Ct. 527, 801.
2
This persistence was particularly marked in efforts to defeat suits for
infringement of patents, trademarks and copyrights. Prior to 1942"the defense
was 3rejected in 35 such cases in the lower federal courts. See infra note 226.
4 See infra, pp. 531, 554.
See infra, pp. 539-40.
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approach to the problem. 5 Even Congress gave an equivocal blessing to the defense in trademark litigation during the past year "
These indications of a trend toward broader recognition of the
defense call for its re-examination and re-appraisal.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE DEFENSE

When the Sherman Act was adopted in 1890, Congress provided four sanctions for enforcement of the anti-trust policy These
were criminal penalties, injunction by government suit, forfeiture
of property under limited circumstances, and a private action for
treble damages by persons injured in their property or business
by violation of the act.7 Nothing in the act as it came from Congress expressly authorized violation of the Sherman Act to be
asserted as a defense to a civil action. This was no oversight, for
the legislative history shows that such a sanction was repeatedly
called to the attention of the lawmakers at the time Sherman Act
was under consideration.
Seven of the twenty-one anti-trust bills 8 introduced in Congress
in the same month as the original Sherman bill contained section
authorizing such a defense in various terms. Two expressly provided that the purchaser of any commodity from a violator would
not be liable for the priceY Five deprived the federal courts of
jurisdiction to enforce rights arising out of transactions in violation of the act. 10 One of these was referred to the Senate Finance
Committee on the same day it received the Sherman Bill." Indeed,
the original Sherman Bill itself contained an analogous provision
permitting any person damaged by a violation to recover back
the full purchase price of any commodity advanced in price by an
12
illegal combination.
sSee
infra, pp. 542-49.
0

See infra, pp. 566-68.

T(1890) 26 Stat. at L. 209, (1940) 15 U. S. C. § 1-7
8

For the text and history of all bills see Bills and Debates in Congress
Relating to Trusts, (1903) Sen. Doc. No. 147, 57th Cong., 2nd Sess., Bills
and Debates in Congress Relating to Trusts, 1902-1913, Prepared for Coinmittee on Judiciary, House of Representatives (1914)
9(1889) H.R. 202 and (1890) H.R. 3844, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., cf. (1888)
H.R. 6117, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (same)
10(1889) S. 6, H.R. 509, H.R. 811, H.R. 826, H.R. 846, 51st Cong., Ist
Sess., cf. (1888) S. 3476, S.3510, H.R. 11279, H.R. 11343, 50th Cong., Ist
Sess. (same)
"1(1889) S. 6 and (1889) S. 1 (Sherman bill) See (1889) 21 Cong.
Rec. 96.
12See § 2 of (1889) S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted 21 Cong. Rec.
1765. Similar provisions appeared in (1889) H.R. 270 and (1889) H.R. 286.
51st Cong., lst Sess. This same provision remained in the bill recommended
for passage by the Senate Finance Committee in the preceding Congress.
(1888) S. 3445, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. See (1889) 20 Cong. Rec. 1120-21.
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With all this material under consideration, two Senate committees and one House committee recommended passage of antitrust legislation containing no reference to violation of the law as
a defense to a civil sut.1 3 The only private sanction recommended
was that for treble damages. 4 On the floor of the Senate, one
amendment" and one substitute bill,'2 each containing provisions
which would have authorized the defense, were voted down, but
the defense was a minor factor not mentioned in the debates and
likely did not influence the votes.
It would be a mistake to attach much significance to this legislative history. At no time during the debates on the bill was any
vote directed to this one issue. Still, the fact that this device was
before both the Senate and the House, in committee and otherwise, in a number of different forms, without adoption or even
being brought to a vote, at least indicates that there was no substantial enthusiasm for it.
This was not the case in a number of state legislatures during
this same period. In 1890 and 1891 five states provided in their
anti-trust laws that the purchaser from a violator could prove the
violation as a complete defense to an action for the purchase price.' 7
Within fifteen years three additional states had added such a
provision,' 8 and two more had provided that a person damaged
"SThe Senate bills were introduced on December 4 and the House bills
on December 18, 1889, except for H.R. 3844 which was introduced on January 6, 1890 and was identical in its defense provision with H.R. 202. See
(1889-90) 21 Cong. Rec. 232, 243, 254, 255, 256, 402. The Senate Finance
Committee recommended out the revamped Sherman bill on January 14, 1890.
See (1890) 21 Cong. Rec. 541. It seems a reasonable assumption that the
Senate committee would have examined not only the bills referred to it, but
also the pending House bills on the same subject. All this material was
also available to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to which tie bill was
referred after lengthy Senate debate and many amendments. See (1890) 21
Cong. Rec. 2731. That Committee drafted a completely new bill which gave
no recognition to the defense. See (1890) 21 Cong. Rec. 2901. The House
Committee on the Judiciary, to which the Sherman Bill was referred after its
passage in the Senate, had before it house bills containing each type of defense provision. H.R. 202 and HR 3844 (defense to action for purchase
price) ; H.R. 811 and H.R. 846 (federal courts deprived of jurisdiction). See
(1889-90) 21 Cong. Rec. 232, 254, 256, 402. Yet the House Committee recommended passage of the Senate bill without change. See (1890) House Rep.
No. 1707,
51st Cong., 1st Sess., (1890) 21 Cong. Rec. 4088.
14 The Committee on the Judiciary substitute treble damages for the
double damages recommended in the bill previously reported out by the
Committee on Finance. See (1890) 21 Cong. Rec. 2455, 2901.
"rSee
(1890) 21 Cong. Rec. 2613-15.
'8 See (1890) 21 Cong. Rec. 2657-61.
'7I1. Laws 1891, p. 206 § 6; Iowa Laws 1890, c. 28, § 5, Mo. Laws 1891,
p. 186, § 5, N. Mex. Laws 1891, c. 10, § 3; Okla. Stat. 1890, § 6621.
1905,"sArk.
c. Acts
1. 1905, No. 1, § 4, Neb. Laws 1897, c. 79, § 10; N. D. Laws
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by the violation could recover back the entire purchase price."
21
With two exceptions 2 those provisions are still in effect.
Approval of this defense in state legislation led to no change
by Congress. A number of bills for amending and supplementing
the Sherman Act included this type of defense as an incidental
feature, but all died in committee.2 2 After 1890 no bill appears to
have been introduced for the primary purpose of recognizing this
defense with one perennial exception. From 1894 to 1933 repeated efforts were made to secure legislation to defeat patent
infringement suits when the patent was being used to violate the
anti-trust laws. 22 The nearest such a patent bill came to enactment

was an inadvertent one-day Senate approval, quickly recalled upon
discovery 24
i9Ind. Laws 1897, c. 104, § 5, S. C. Laws 1897, No. 265, § 4.
20
See Ark. Acts 1913, No. 161, §1, Neb. Laws 1905, c. 162, not containing such a defense provision, was held to repeal the earlier act by implication.
See State v. Omaha Elev. Co., (1906) 75 Neb. 637, 106 N. W 979, 110
N. W
2 874.
lSee Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, c. 38, § 574, Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. 1933, § 23105, Iowa Code 1946, § 553.5, Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1939, § 8310; N. M.
Stat. 1941 Ann., § 51-1103, N. D. Rev. Code 1943, § 51-0808, Okla. Stat.
Ann. 1938, Title 79, § 35, S. C. Code 1942, § 6622. Several other states early
adopted and still have provisions in their anti trust laws providing in somewhat more equivocal terms that it shall be a defense to a civil action to
show that the cause of action "grew out of" business transacted in violation
of the law. Ariz. Acts 1912, c. 73, § 8, Ariz. Code Ann. 1939, § 74-105,
Colo. Laws 1913, c. 161, § 6, Colo. Stat. Ann. 1935, c. 167, § 6, Kan. Laws
1897, c. 265, § 7, Kan. Gen. Stat. 1935, § 50-107, Tenn. Laws 1889, c. 250,
§ 3, c. 218, § 5, Williams Tenn. Code 1939, § 5885. As an alternative to the
above defense, the Kansas statute also provides that it shall be a defense
to any civil action to show that the plaintiff within one year prior to coiimencement of the action was guilty of violating the anti-trust law. Mississippi
broadly provides that every contract made with "any member of any trust
or combine for any purpose relative to the business of such trust or combine"
is void and unenforceable. Miss. Code 1892, § 4438, Miss. Code Ann. 1942,
§ 1093. But cf. McCall Co. v. Hughes, (1912) 102 Miss. 375, 59 So. 794,
which enforced a contract relating to the business of a violator without referring to the above provision. See also Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, (1922)
131 Miss. 343, 378, 94 So. 7 But cf. Universal Film Exchanges v. West, (1932)
163 Miss. 272, 141 So. 293.
22(1892) S. 1728, H.R. 6640, 52d Cong., 1st Sess., (1893) H. R. 240,
53d Cong., 1st Sess., (1895) H.R. 868, 54th Cong., 1st Sess., (1902) S. 6600,
57th Cong., 2d Sess., (1907) S. 100, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., (1909) S. 3736,
H.R. 16228, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., (1912) S. 4103, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., (1912)
S. 7680, 62d Cong., 3d Sess., (1913) S. 191, S. 2552, 63d Cong., 1st Sess.
23(1894) S. 1428, cf. S. 2387, H.R. 7739, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., (1894)
H.R. 8192, 53d Cong., 3d Sess., (1908) H.R. 20388, 60th Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1909) H.R. 11796, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., (1911) H.R. 2158, H.R. 2930,
H.R. 13909, 62d Cong., 1st Sess.. (1913) S. 2552, 63d Cong., Ist Sess.,
(1914) H.R. 14865, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., (1928) S. 2783, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess., explained (1928) 69 Cong. Rec. 8382, (1929) 70 Cong. Rec. 2287,
(1930) S. 4442, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., history given infra note 24, (1931) S.
1866, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., (1933) S. 341, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
24(1930) S. 4442, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., was reported out recommended for
passage by the Committee on Patents. See (1930) 72 Cong. Rec. 9778, Sen.
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In 1914 when the Clayton Act was adopted the need was recognized for more effective legal relief to private parties injured by
violation of the anti-trust laws.25 Private parties threatened by
loss or damage from violation of the law were given the right to
injunctive relief,2 and treble damage actions were facilitated by
making judgment in a government suit or prosecution prima facie
evidence of the -violation there established.2 7 Despite these efforts
to aid private parties, no action was taken to incorporate the provisions of pending bills which would have authorized broad application of the defense that the plaintiff in a civil action had violated
the anti-trust laws.28
The closest Congress ever came to approving this defense for
Rep. 757, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. The bill was unanimously passed by the Senate
four days later without explanation or debate. See (1930) 72 Cong. Rec. 9864.
The next day the Senate requested the House to return the bill when a
senator expressed his desire to move to reconsider the bill. See (1930) 72
Cong. Rec. 9924. The House complied although a representative expressed
his fear that the Senate might "chloroform" the bill. See (1930) 72 Cong.
Rec. 10072. It did. The bill as passed by the Senate provided two defenses
to an infringement suit: (1) Agreement by the complainant with any other
person owning patent rights relating to the same business, the effect of which
is to substantially lessen compebntion or tend to create a monopoly. (2) Use
or control of the patent by the complainant in violation of the anti-trust laws.
See (1930) 72 Cong. Rec. 9864. On its return to the Senate, Senator Dill,
the originator of the bill, explained his intent to strike out the first defense, so
that the bill would create no new illegalities. See (1930) 72 Cong. Rec. 11583.
Nothing more was heard of the bill, excepting introduction of similar bills
by Senator Dill m 1931 and 1933. Since that date legislative proposals in this
direction have been directed toward compulsory licensing. See Note (1946)
56 Yale
L. J. 77, 116-18.
25
See President Wilson's recommendations, (1914) House Journal, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess., p. -130; (1914) Report of the House and Senate Committees
on the Judiciary on (1914) H.R. 15657 (Clayton bill), House Report No.
627, pp. 14, 21, (1914) Senate Report No. 698, pp. 45, 50, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.,
(1914) 51 Cong. Rec. 9090, 9261, 9489, 13849-58, cf. (1911) 47 Cong. Rec.
4189-90.
26(1914) 38 Stat. at L. 737, § 16, (1940) 15 U. S. C. § 26.
27(1914) 38 Stat. at L. 731, § 5, (1940) 15 U. S. C. § 16.
28(1913) S. 191, S. 2552, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. The latter bill, introduced
by Senator La Follette, would have added to the Sherman Act the following"
"Section 20. That it shall be a complete defense to any suit arising out of any
contract, or for the infringement of any patent, that the plaintiff, or the
real party in interest, at the time of the making of such contract, or of its
alleged breach, or at the time of the alleged infringement, or at the time of
the beginning of said suit, was engaged in carrying on business in any
manner or to any extent in violation of the provisions of this Act." The
House Committee on the Judiciary, which reported out the Clayton Bill
[H.R. 15657, (1914) House Rep. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.], examined Senator
La Follette's bill, and credited it and a companion bill by a Wisconsin representative [(1913) H.R. 54, 63d Cong., 1st Sess.] with providing the model
for its amendment making a judgment in a government suit or prosecution
conclusive evidence of the violation there established for use in a private
treble damage action. See (1914) 51 Cong. Rec. 9488. Adoption of one of
Senator La Follette's provisions to aid private parties suggests that omission
of the other was not inadvertant.
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any purpose was in the Trade-Mark Act of 1946.29 Under that
Act the plaintiff in an infringement suit who has used his trademark to violate the anti-trust laws is clearly deprived of the incontestability rights created by the Act, and it may be interpreted
to make such violation a complete defense to an infringement suit.
This effect of the Act will be considered at a later point."0
With this one possible exception in the Trade-Mark Act, Congress has never shown any disposition to enact legislation giving
affirmative approval to the defense that the plaintiff in a private
action has violated the anti-trust laws. On the other hand, no
genuine issue has ever been made of the defense so as to bring it
to a vote on either floor of Congress. Therefore, it cannot be said
that Congress has ever affirmatively indicated either its disapproval of the defense, or its dissatisfaction with the manner in
which the defense has been handled in the courts.
COMMON LAw BACKGROUND

OF THE DEFENSE

Failure of Congress to provide expressly for the defense in
the anti-trust legislation can hardly be taken as a disapproval of its
use in appropriate cases in view of the common law background
of the terms used in the Sherman Act.
In prohibiting contracts, combinations and conspiracies "in
restraint of trade," and making it unlawful to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize," 3' Congress adopted language which reached
far back into the common law Ever since 14152 the common law
courts had been refusing to enforce contracts or agreements "in
restraint of trade" or tending toward a monopoly,a though there
29(1946) 60 Stat. at L. 427, 15 U. S. C. A. 1051-1127 (Supp. 1946)
30See infra, pp. 566-68.
3"See (1890) 26 Stat. at L. 209, (1940) 15 U. S. Code, § 1, 2.
32Annonymous-"Dyer's Case," (1415) Y. B. 2 Hen. V, f. 5, pl. 26.
33
The broad scope of the common law doctrine is succinctly summarized
by Mr. Justice Stone in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, (1940) 310 U. S.469,
497, 60 S.Ct. 982, where he adds that the "common law doctrines relating to
contracts and combinations in restraint of trade were well understood long
before the enactment of the Sherman law." See also the exhaustive opinion
by Taft, J., in United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., (C.C.A. 6th
1898) 85 Fed. 271, 279-91. The cases and secondary authorities are collected
in Handler, Cases and Materials on Trade Regulation, (1937) 102-206. For
a summary of the cases prior to 1890 dealing with the contracts not to compete see Smith's Leading Cases (8th Am. Ed., 1885) 765-83, annotation to
Mitchell v. Reynolds, (1711) 1 P Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 3 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. of Law, (1887) 882-86. For a thorough analysis of the cases
prior to 1890 relating to the less orthodox "restraint of trade" by price
fixing and similar restrictive trade practices see Peppin, Price Fixing Agreements under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, (1940) 28 Calif. L. Rev. 297
308-351, Note, (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 291. 295-97
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had been no complete harmony as to the scope of the doctrine."
The principal sanction by which this policy had been developed
and enforced was simply the refusal of the Courts to give any aid
to parties seeking to enforce contracts in restraint of trade.33
Refusal to enforce such contracts was merely one expression
of the more general common law doctrine that courts would refuse
their aid to parties seeking to enforce agreements which were
illegal or contrary to public policy. 38 This doctrine was applied
34See Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, (1928) 76
U. Pa. L. Rev. 244; Handler, The Sugar Institute Case and the Present
Status of the Anti-Trust Laws, (1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 1, 19-20; Peppin,
supra note 33 at 308-351; Jaffe and Tobriner, The Legality of Price Fixing
Agreements, (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1164, 1166-74, Note, (1932) 32 Col.
L. Rev. 291, 293-97.
35See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, (1940) 310 U. S. 469, 497, 60 S..Ct.
982; United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., (C.C.A. 6th 1889) 85
Fed. 271, 279; Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor Gow & Co., (1891)
[1892] A. C. 25 passim. The cases cited above all concur in the conclusion
that contracts m restraint of trade were "illegal and unenforceable at common law" but "were not penalized and gave rise to no actionable wrong." A
brief examination of any summary of the common law restraint of trade
cases will demonstrate that in nearly all of the cases the defense of illegality
was asserted against an attempt to enforce the contract See, e.g., Sanderson,
Restraint of Trade in English Law, (1926) 7-47, Smith's Leading Cases,
(8th Am. ed., 1885) 756-83; Peppin, supra note 33 at 327-49. The convictions
in England for price fixing combinations were based primarily upon statutes,
though there is some dispute as to whether some may have had their origin
in the common law. See Peppin, supra note 33 at 310-24. Examination of
Professor Peppin's collection of American cases relating to price fixing prior
to 1890 (28 Calif. L. Rev. at 336-50) reveals that none were criminal cases
except those few relating to conspiracies to raise wages (id. at 342-44) and
one abortive attempt to convict for a genuine price fixing agreement. Commonwealth v. Tack, (Phila. Quar. Sess., 1868) 1 Brewst. 511. At an early
date the Statute of Monopolies authorized private actions for treble damages
in favor of those harmed by a monopoly. (1623-4) 21 Jac. I, c. 3. While
that statute provides that all monopolies shall be tried "according to the
common law of this realm," there is nothing to indicate that damages for
monopoly or other restraint of trade were allowed at common law. Cf.
Peppin, sipra note 635 at 28 Calif. L. Rev. 305, n. 27 Mogul Steamship Co.
v. McGregor Gow & Co., supra, expressly rules that no such damages were
allowable at common law. Immediately prior to enactment of the Sherman
Act, the sanction of quo warranto to dissolve a corporation engaging in particularly vicious types of restraint of trade was invoked in a few cases. People
ex. rel. Peabody v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., (1889) 130 IIl. 268, 22 N. E. 798,
People v. North River Sugar Refimng Co., (1889) 54 Hun. 354, 7 N. Y.
Supp. 406; State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., (1890) 29 Neb. 700, 46 N. W
155. These scattered exceptions only serve to emphasize the conclusion that
the policy against restraint of trade was developed and enforced primarily
through refusal of the courts to enforce "rights" arising out of agreements
contravening the policy. Cf. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of
Business Competition, (1926) 35 Yale L. J. 905, 36 Yale L. J. 42, 207, at 215.
36See, eg., Hanauer v. Doane, (U.S. 1871) 12 Wall. 342, 349; Williston.
Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1937) c. 48-52, Restatement, Contracts, c. 18. See standard textbooks at time Sherman Act -as adopted cited infra note 44.
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both to agreements which violated statutory law" and to those
found to violate "public policy" as determined by the courts. 8 The
policy against restraint of trade was primarily a court-created
policy, 9 which was supplemented by early English and American
40
statutes aimed at the grosser restraints, and which finally found
nation-wide expression in the Sherman Act. 4
In the Sherman Act Congress simply took over the common
law terms and concepts relating to restraint of trade and made
them clearly applicable to interstate and foreign commerce. It
broadened them slightly so as to make certain to include combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade regardless of form, and
fitted them out with the public remedies of criminal prosecution,
injunction and forfeiture and the private remedy of treble darnages. 42 There was nothing whatever in the Act to indicate any intention to take away that sanction which had been the very tool
by which the common law policy against restraint of trade had
been developed.
The lawyers in Congress, who constituted a substantial majority

of all senators and representatives,43 must have been familiar with
this common law background. The standard American textbooks
37See, e.g., Gibbs v. Baltimore Gas Co., (1889)

130 U. S. 396, 9 S. Ct.

553, See Williston, Contracts, § 1628, 1763 et seq. and textbooks cited infra
note 44.
38See, e.g., Oscanyan v. Arms Co., (1881) 103 U. S. 261. See Williston,
Contracts, § 1628-1629, and textbooks cited mira note 44.
3aSee, e.g., Mitchell v. Reynolds, (1711) 1 P Wins. 181, 186-97, 24 Eng.
Rep. 347, 351-52, Alger v. Thatcher. (1837) 19 Pick. 51, 53-54, Oregon Steam
Navigation Co. v. Winsor, (U.S. 1873) 20 Wall. 64, 68, Nordenfelt v. Maxim
Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., (1894) [1894] A. C. 535, 553, Craft v.
McDonough, (1875) 79 Il. 346, Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., (1890) 47 Ohio
St. 320, 24 N. E. 660, Matthews, Covenants in Restraint of Trade, (1907)
1-6, Gare, Covenants in Restraint of Trade, (1935) 1-19, cf. Peppin, supra
note 33 at 316-24.
4OSee Jones, supra note 35, Peppin, supra note 33, at 310-15.
4'At about the same time, the policy against monopoly and restraint of
trade was also finding expression in state statutes creating criminal and
other sanctions. Ill. Laws 1891, p. 206, Iowa Laws 1890, c. 28, Ky. Acts
1889, c. 1621, Maine Acts 1889, c. 266, Mo. Laws 1891, p. 186, New Mex.
Laws 1891, c. 10, Okla. Stat. 1890, § 6619; Tenn. Laws 1889, c. 250, Tex.
Laws 1889, p. 141.
4-See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, (1940) 310 U. S. 469, 498, 60 S. Ct.
982, 43(1890) 21 Cong. Rec. 2456, 3152, 5955, (1903) 36 Cong. Rec. 522-23.
1n the Senate 68 of the 86 senators, or 79%, were lawyers. In the
House 225 of the 328 representatives, or 69%. were lawyers. All members
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary which drafted the bill as finally
adopted were lawyers, as were all members of the House Committee on the
Judiciary which recommended its passage. See note 15 supra. Six of the
ten members of the Senate Committee on Finance which first reported out the
Sherman Act for passage were also lawyers. See biographical sketches and
records of committee membership in (1890) Congressional Directory, 51st
Cong. 1st Sess., Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 13, Part 3, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.
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of that day on the basic subject of Contracts stressed the defense
of illegality, and its application to contracts in restraint of trade."4
This background was emphasized at the very beginning of the
debates when a number of cases were stated in which the courts
refused to enforce such contracts.

45

In view of this common law background, at least those lawyers
in Congress who were instrumental in drafting the Act and determining its scope must have realized that violation of the anti-trust
laws would be raised promptly as a defense in civil actions and
that under established common law doctrine the defense would be
available in many cases without any express provision in the Act
to that effect. Failure to include an express provision in that
regard would therefore seem to indicate only an intention to let
the courts determine the scope of the defense rather than to
exclude it altogether. This conclusion seens consistent with and
reinforced by the evident purpose of Congress to leave to the
courts the greater problem of giving precision of meaning to its
general expression of policy against monopolies and restraint of
trade.46
44Page citations in the following texts refer respectively to recognition
of (1) defense of illegality (unenforceability), (2) public policy as one basis
for the defense, (3) the defense applied to restraint of trade, and (4) the
defense applied to price fixing, elimination of competitive bidding, agreements tending toward monopoly and other restrictions on competition as
distinct from the typical contracts not to compete. See Anson, English Law
of Contract (2nd Am. ed., 1887) 223, 238 and 248, 248-49, 249; Bishop,
Law of Contracts (1887) 180, 181, 195-99, 198 and 200; Chitty, Law of Contracts (8th Am. ed. 1851) 570, 575, 576-78, 578, (11th Am. ed., 1874) 971,
982, 982-87, 987; 2 Parsons, Law of Contracts (4th ed., 1860) 253-4, 253,
254-260, 260; Pollock, Principles of Contracts (1st Am. ed., 1881) 241 and
317, 276, 309-17, 309-10; Smith, Law of Contracts (7th Am. ed., 1885) 208,
212, 213-27 The same recognition of these basic principles appears in the
following: 3 American & English Encyclopedia (1887), 869, 875, 882-86,
885-86; 1 Bouvier, Institutes of American Law (1851), 295, 297, Smith,
Leading Cases (8th Am. ed. 1885) 756 and 777, 777, 756-83 and 782-83.
45See (1890) 21 Cong. Rec. 2456-60.
46Senator Hoar, a member of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
in 1890, claimed to have drafted the Sherman Act as finally adopted by
Congress. See 2 Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (1903) 364, cf.
Peppin, supra n. 35, 28 Calif. L. Rev. at 306 n. 29. He explamed that the
Committee thought "it was best to use this general phrase [restraint of
trade] which, as we thought, had an accepted and well known meaning in
the English law, and then after it had been construed by the Court, and a
body of decisions had grown up under the law, Congress would be able to
make such further amendments as might be found by experience necessary."
See Hoar, op. cit. supra at 364, quoted also in (1908) 42 Cong. Rec. 5438. See
Senator Hoar's statement m Congress that the common law language was deliberately chosen. (1903) 36 Cong. Rec. 522-23. During the debates on the bill
in the House, it was frankly admitted that the scope and coverage of the act
would not be known until it was construed by the Courts. See (1890) 21 Cong.
Rec. 4089, 4092, 4100.
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THE DEFENSE IN THE SUPREME COURT4 7

The defense that the plaintiff should be denied judicial aid to
enforce a private right arising out of violation of the anti-trust
laws has been raised in two general classes of cases (1) Those
involving attempts to enforce or protect 48 contract rights of various
kinds, and (2) those involving attempts to secure remedies for
torts, principally actions for infringement of patents, copyrights or
trade-marks. With one minor exception, 49 the contract cases were
the only ones in which the defense was considered by the Supreme
Court prior to 1942. 50
The defense as applied to contracts.
The problem first arose in 1902 in Connolly v Umon Sewer
Pipe Co.5 This was an action to recover for the price of pipe sold
to the defendants. The defense was that the plaintiff was a "trust"
or "combination" through which several competitors had pooled
their interests and agreed to maintain prices in excess of the market
value, and that this action was to recover the price of goods sold
by plaintiff while acting as such combination in violation of the
common law and the Sherman Act.52 The Supreme Court sustained
the action of the trial court which had rejected the defense and
directed a verdict for the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court recognized that no recovery could be allowed on a contract in violation of a statute, and referred to its
recent extended review of the cases which it had summarized as
holding unanimously that
"
no court will lend its assistance in any way toward carrying
out the terms of an illegal contract."5
47Limitations of space forbid consideration of the history of the defense
in the lower federal courts except as their decisions may shed light on the
Supreme
Court decisions.
48
The cases involving the tort of inducing breach of contract are here
classified under contract rights since they involve basically the same problem-the attempt to make the contract effective by invoking aid of the
courts.
49 See infra p. 524.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., (1927) 273
359, 47 S. Ct. 400, explained infra note 225.
U. S.
5
See infra pp. 552-69.
51(1902) 184 U. S. 540, 22 S. Ct. 431.
52A third defense relied on the plaintiff's violation of the 1893 Illinois
anti-trust statute which expressly provided that violation of the statute
would be a defense in an action against the purchaser for the price. This
defense was defeated by ruling that the Illinois statute violated the equal
protections clause of the federal constitution because it exempted agricultural
products and livestock. See 184 U S. at 552-65. The decision did not affect
the 1891 statute cited in note 17 supra and still in effect.
53
See 184 U. S. at 549, quoting from McMullen v. Hoffman, (1899) 174
U. S. 639, 654, 19 S. Ct. 839. Two months later the Court repeated its dictum
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It then denied the defense on the ground that neither the common
law nor the Sherman Act made unlawful the sale of property by
an illegal combination, and that this was an action to enforce contracts of sale which were "collateral" to the illegal arrangement
rather than to enforce the illegal arrangement itself.54
Three years earlier, in refusing to enforce a partnership contract which involved collusive bids, the Court had emphasized that
the reason for refusing to enforce rights arising out of illegal
contracts was to discourage such transactions and reduce them
to a rmnimum. 55 Liberal application of that reason might well
have led to a different result in this initial case. Certainly, it
seems anomalous to rule that parties to an illegal price fixing
agreement will be denied judicial aid against a backsliding conspirator but are entitled to judicial aid to enforce the agreed price
against their victims. Refusal to aid Sherman Act violators in
reaping excessive profits from their victims would be far more
effective in promoting the policy of the law than refusal to enforce the price fixing agreement against fellow-conspirators who
will voluntarily comply with it while it is profitable. To enforce the
"collateral" contract lends the aid of the Court to the law violators
in accomplishing the very purpose of their conspiracy and one of
the primary evils at which the Sherman Act was amied--sales at
artificially pegged prices.
The Court was not forced by precedent to deny the defense in
the Connolly case.56 In classifying the sale as "collateral" to the
illegal transaction and hence enforceable, 57 the Court was invoking a previously recogriized but ill-defined limitation on the dethat it would enforce no contract m violation of the Sherman Act but
found no violation had been proved. Bement v. National Harrow Co., (1902)
186 U. S. 70, 88, 22 S. Ct. 747
54
See 184 U. S. at 545, 547, 549-51.
55
McMullen v. Hoffman, (1899) 174 U. S. 639, 669-70, 19 S. Ct. 839.
56
The decisions in point were by inferior courts which had permitted
recovery for the price of goods or services sola by members of an intrastate price fixing combination not violating the Sherman Act. The Charles
E. Wisehall, (1898 C.C.A. 2d) 86 Fed. 671; National Distilling Co. v.
Cream City Importing Co., (1893) 86 Wis. 352, 56 N. W. 864, cf. Dennehy v.
McNulta, (1898 C.C.A. 7th) 86 Fed. 825 (attempt by buyer to recover back
part of price from member of illegal combination). A host of such decisions
now stem from the Connolly case. See Williston, Contracts § 1661.
57
Subsequent decisions confirm the conclusion that the "collateral"
nature of the sale was the basis for the decision. See Continental Wall Paper
Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., (1909) 212 U. S. 227, 261, 29 S. Ct. 280; Wilder
Mffg. Co. v. Corn Products Co., (1915) 236 U. S. 165, 172, 35 S. Ct. 398;
Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., (1925) 267 U. S. 248, 252, 45 S. Ct. 300.
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fense of illegality 5s Previous Supreme Court decisions invoking
the limitation59 could easily have been distinguished had the Court
chosen to do so. None of them had sustained, as collateral or
otherwise, an attempt to enforce "rights" growing out of an illegal
transaction against one whom the law was devised to protect, and
the absence of this feature had been stressed in one case.00 None
had lent the aid of the Court in the accomplishment of an illegal
purpose. None had enforced contracts made in furtherance or aid
of an illegal purpose, and one had suggested that such a subsequent collateral contract would not be enforced."' The only cases
involving attempts to enforce collateral contracts in aid of an illegal purpose or plan had denied relief by finding that such contracts were themselves illegal or contrary to public policy 02 Cer'5 See e.g. the involved opinion three years earlier in which the earlier
cases involving "collateral" transactions were reviewed. McMullen v. Hoffman, (1889) 174 U. S. 639, 19 S. Ct. 839. Even the latest treatise on Contracts still reveals considerable uncertainty as to where the line is to be
drawn. See Williston, Contracts § 1752-56.
59 The leading case enforced as collateral an agreement to repay funds
advanced to procure legal release of goods seized by the government for
prior illegal importation by defendant. Armstrong v. Toler, (U.S. 1826) 11
Wheat. 258. The next upheld as collateral an insurance contract on a
vessel not legally registered and hence subject to forfeiture to the goveriiment. Ocean Insurance Co. v. Polleys, (U.S. 1839) 13 Peters 157 Another upheld an assignment of the amount due on an executed illegal contract, which amount had later been voluntarily paid to the assignor, but
suggested that the Court would not enforce a "subsequent collateral contract if made in aid and in furtherance of the execution of" an illegal contract. McBlair v. Gibbes (U.S. 1855) 17 How. 232, 236. A later case
required one partner to share with another the proceeds resulting froni
executed illegal transactions. Brooks v. Martin, (U.S. 1864) 2 Wall 70. The
case was questioned and its authority as a precedent limited to its facts in
McMullen v. Hoffman (1899) 174 U. S. 639, 668, 19 S. Ct. 839, wlich held
that one partner, could not recover from another his share of the profits from
an executed legal contract because the partners had pretended to submit competitive bids for the contract. See Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired
Through Illegal Transactions, (1947) 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 261, 293, indicating
that the English predecessors of Brooks v. Martin were discredited prior to
the Connolly case. Cf. Planter's Bank v. Union Bank (U.S. 1873) 16 Wall
483 (an agent making an illegal sale required to account to his principal
for the proceeds) But cf. Irwin v. Williar, (1884) 110 U. S. 499, 4 S. Ct.
160; Embrey v. Jemison, (1889) 131 U S. 336, 9 S. Ct. 776 (broker
negotiating sale for future delivery found to be wagering contract cannot
recover amount due from principal)
6
oSee Brooks v. Martin, (U.S. 1864) 2 Wall. 70, passm.
G62 See McBlair v. Gibbes, (U.S. 1855) 17 How. 232, 236.
6 Hanauer v. Doane, (U.S. 1871) 12 Wall. 342 (Sale to contractor
known to be purchasing supplies for confederate army) , Hanauer v. Woodruff, (U.S. 1873) 15 Wall. 439 (Note in payment for confederate bonds
already in circulation) In the latter case the court conceded that the purchase of the bonds was collateral to the illegal issue of the bonds, but held
that because the purchase of the bonds gave them "value and currency"
and hence advanced the purpose for which they were issued, it "draws to
itself the illegality of the original transaction."
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tamly, then, precedents would have permitted the Court to rule
in the Connolly case that it was contrary to public policy to enforce a sale (1) made at a rigged price in execution or aid of an
illegal price fixing agreement, (2) against a member of the buying
public for whose protection the law was devised, (3) when recovery would aid the law violator to accomplish the very purpose of
3
his illegal agreement.6
The opinion does not make articulate the underlying reasons
for the Court's choice to apply the collateral contract doctrine to
defeat the defense of illegality The following reasons are suggested:
(1) Though the defense could have been recognized without
doing violence to prior precedents, it would have required an extension beyond prior applications of the doctrine. The Court may
well have hesitated to extend the doctrine for the benefit of a buyer
who sought a windfall by retaining but not paying for commodities he had purported to buy Three years earlier it had recognized this unfortunate aspect of the defense of illegality, but had
ruled, in effect, that the policy of encouraging compliance with
the law by refusing to enforce rights arising out of violations
was more important than avoiding incidental benefits to undeserving
parties.6 ' Rejection of the defense here would appear to indicate
630n the premise that "the whole doctrine of avoiding contracts for
illegality and immorality is founded on public policy" the Court reasoned
in Hanauer v. Doane, supra note 62, that "it is certainly contrary to public
policy to give the aid of the courts to a vendor who knew that his goods
were purchased . . for the purpose of being employed in the commission
of a criminal act, injurious to society or to any of its members." See 12 Wall
at 349. By a similar approach the Court was free to rule that it was contrary
to public policy to give the aid of the Court to a vendor who sold his goods
in execution and culmination of a criminal price-fixing conspiracy injurious
to society and its members, including the buyer. It could have ruled, as in
the Hanauer cases, supra note 62, that though the sale at the pegged price
was collateral to the illegal price fixing agreement it so defeated the policy of
Congress as-to be itself contrary to public policy and hence illegal.
64See McMullen v. Hoffman, (1899) 174 U. S. 639, 669; 19 S. Ct. 839;
cf. Pullman's Car Co. v. Transportation Co., (1898) 171 U. S. 138, 150-52,
18 S. Ct 808; White Water Valley Canal Co. v. Vallette, (U.S. 1859) 21
How. 414, 425; Williston, Contracts § 1630, p. 4562.
65
See Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight & Sons Co., (1909) 212
U. S. 227, 270-71, 29 S. Ct. 280, considered mfra pp. 521-24. Although Mr.
Justice Holmes was appointed to the Court after the Connolly case, lie wvas
joined in the above expression by Justices Brewer, Peckham and White
who had concurred in the Connolly decision. This expression takes on added
weight when it is noted that the minority became a majority in the third
major case, in which Chief Justice White wrote the opinion. See Wilder
Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Co., (1915) 236 U. S. 165, 35 S. Ct. 398, discussed pp. 524-29 infra. A similar viewpoint was intimated by Mr. Justice
Holmes in an earlier opinion joined in by six of the justices who had concurred in the Connolly decision. See Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, (1906) 200
U. S. 179, 185, 26 S. Ct 208, considered infra pp. 520-21.
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that the Court considered the policy of requiring buyers to pay
for their purchases more important that the discouragement of
anti-trust violations, at least when such discouragement would involve any extension of the common law doctrine of illegality This
philosophy -was given expression in Mr. justice Holmes' dissent
against application of the defense in favor of a buyer in 1909
CC the policy of not furthering the purposes of the trust is
less important than the policy of preventing people from getting
other people's property for nothing when they purport to be
buying it."6
(2) The Court was cognizant of the direct remedy by recovery of treble damages provided by Congress for victims of antitrust violators. 6 It may have concluded that such a remedy was
adequate to deter violators and protect their victims without the
necessity for judicial recognition of a remedy -which went beyond
the traditional application of the defense of illegality to statutory
violations. In a somewhat different form, this consideration was
given controlling weight in a later decision.
(3) The Court may possibly have been influenced by the failure
of Congress to provide expressly for this defense in favor of a buyer
from an illegal combination. The opinion states that a different
problem would have been presented had Congress done so, 07 but
there is no indication in the opinion or the briefs that the Court
was cognizant of the legislative history relating to the defense
in Congress.68 Such history might well be advanced as justification
for not extending the defense beyond its traditional common law
applications.
(4) The Court may also have been influenced by the undesirability of complicating a simple action on a note or contract
with the tremendous volume of collateral evidence often required
to establish violation of the anti-trust laws. The defense might
thus dwarf the original issue. Nothing in the opinion appears to
suggest this reason.6"
Three years after the Connolly case, the defense was again
raised in an action for the purchase price of two river packets. 0
6
OSee 184 U. S. at 552. The reference to treble damages was in refusing
to permit such damages to be established by way of set-off in this action for

the price
of goods sold. On this matter see infra note 206.
07 See 184 U. S. at 552.
68
See supra pp. 508-12.
OgBut see infra pp. 529, 549, 573.
7oCincinnati Packet Co. v Bay, (1906) 200 U. S. 179, 26 S. Ct. 208.
One year earlier the Court had held that violation of the Sherman Act, as
found in Northern Securities Co. v United States, (1904) 193 U. S. 197, 24
S. Ct. 436, barred plaintiff from rescinding his sale of Northern Pacific
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The contract not only stipulated the price but also provided that
the buyer would maintain the rates charged by the seller "above
Portsmouth, Ohio." In a cryptic opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes
the Court "assumed" that the agreement related to rates between
Ohio points although both parties were engaged m interstate
shipping above Portsmouth. It then added that if the agreement
had "any indirect bearing on commerce with another state" this
would not make the whole agreement void so as to defeat an
action for the agreed price."' This decision that the "subordinate
undertaking" to maintain rates would not make the undertaking to
pay the purchase price unlawful takes on added significance in the
light of a 1947 decision which reached the opposite conclusion in a
closely analogous case. 7 - The problem of separating legal from
illegal undertakings will be considered in connection with the
later case.73 It is sufficient to notice that in this 1906 decision the
Court was admittedly influenced by its desire to "be astute to avoid
allowing a party to escape from his just and substantially legal
undertaking on such a ground."74
The second major case dealing with this problem was Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight and Sons Co.75 This was an
action on account brought in the federal Circuit Court for the
unpaid balance due on wall paper sold to defendant. The answer
alleged substantially the same type of combination involved in the
Comolly case by which 98%o of the wall paper manufacturers
pooled their interests to eliminate competition and enhance prices.
It added one important factor: the combination, through its instrumentality, the Wall Paper Company, required that all jobbers
obtaining wall paper agree to take their entire needs from the
combination 6 and to resell only at prices stipulated by the combination. Because he could not obtain wall paper, elsewhere, defendant signed such an agreement. The wall paper for which this
action was brought was ordered and delivered pursuant to that
stock to Northern Securities Company on the ground that property delivered
under an illegal contract cannot be recovered back by a party in pan
delicto. Harriman v. Northern Securities Co., (1905) 197 U. S. 244, 25

S. Ct. 493.

71See
200 U. S. at 185-86.
72
Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct.
416. See also Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight and Sons Co., (1909)
212 U. S.227, 29 S.Ct.280, considered mfra on analogous holding pp. 521-24,
infra pp. 535-40.
73See
74 See 200 U. S. at 185.
75(1909) 212 U. S. 227, 29 S.Ct 280.
76This was accomplished by an agreement to buy all requirements from
plaintiff up to a specified amount, fixed at twice the jobber's requirements in
the past See 212 U. S. at 247-8.
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agreement at prices named in the agreement and previously fixed
by a committee of the manufacturers. Such prices exceeded the fair
market value of the wall paper by more than the amount still due
and sought to be recovered in this action. 77 This answer was held
to state a good defense in a five to four decision.
Mr. justice Harlan, author of the opinion in the Connollv case,
was called upon to distinguish it. This he (lid on the ground that
in the Wall Paper case both plaintiff and defendant were parties to
agreements which were essential parts of the illegal conspiracy
and the accounts sued on were made out pursuant to those illegal
agreements.7 8 He reasoned that judgment for the plaintiff would
give the aid of the Court in making effective the illegal
agreements that constituted the forbidden combination
and by
means of which the combination proposes to accomplish forbidden
79
ends."
The irony of this distinction is highlighted by the argument in
plaintiff's brief that the Connolly case was controlling because
"the defendant was not a member of the trust but a victim of the
trust."80 Fortunately for the "victim" he was found to be a party
to the illegal combination and hence entitled to protection under
the anti-trust laws I
For the minority, Mr. Justice Holmes contended that the sales
were independent of the illegal agreement between the parties,
which only served to establish the price and did not make the sales
illegal.8 He further argued that since under the Connolly decision
the victim's knowledge of the seller's unlawful purpose and his
economic compulsion to buy at an unreasonable price did not relieve him of the duty to pay the price, the mere signing of an illegal agreement under the same compulsion should have no greater
effect."2
While the controversy took the form of determining whether
the contract sued upon was illegal, the opinions revealed that the
basic philosophy of the majority and minority differed. As previously indicated, 3 the minority openly stated that it considered
the policy of making a buyer pay the agreed price more important

infra note 85.
77 8See 212 U. S. at 261.
"See 212 U. S. at 261, 262.
8
oSee Brief for the Petitioner. v. 85. Mr. Justice Holmes, in dissenting,
also stresses that defendant was not a party to the plan, but only a victim,
and hence
should have to pay ? See 212 U. S. at 270-71.
81
82See 212 U. S. at 268-69.
See 212 U. S. at 270-71.
s3See supra p. 520.
77See
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than the policy of not furthering the purposes of the trust.84 On the
other hand, the majority stressed the opposing view that a court
should not
".. lend its aid, in any way, to a party seeking to realize the
fruits of an agreement that appears tainted with illegality, although
the result of applying that rule may sometimes be to shield one
who has got something for which as between man and man he
ought, perhaps, to pay...",s
Such expressions, coupled with ambiguous reference to denying
court aid to "the execution of the agreements which constituted
'
that illegal combination 8s
suggested that, perhaps, the Court
would go beyond this case and refuse to aid in collecting prices
determined by illegal agreements between sellers even without
an illegal agreement -with the buyer, since the latter would be
auxiliary only and could hardly be said to "constitute" the illegal
combination. Possibly for this reason the minority intimated its
fear that the Connolly case was being overruled. 7
Certainly, the decision did not go that far on its facts, and
squared with prior doctrine by limiting the defense to actions attempting to enforce contracts themselves illegal. Nevertheless, it
made progress toward protecting the victim of an illegal conspiracy to fix the price. Such a victim could set up violation of the
anti-trust laws as a defense if he was fortunate enough to have
been required to sign an agreement to buy exclusively from the
combination and to mamtan resale prices dictated by it. Even
though no effort was made to enforce those illegal aspects of the
agreement, their presence in the contract was sufficient to defeat
an action for the agreed price. Had the agreement to pay the price
stood alone, it would have been enforceable under the Coinolly
8
4See
5

212 U. S. at 270-71.
s See 212 U. S. at 262. Neither opinion noted the practical consideration
that the defendant had already paid the "fair market value" of all wall paper
*purchased so that no element of undeserving windfall to the defendant %%as
actually involved. He had already paid over $144,000 and the amount still
due was $56,762.10. See 212 U. S. at 233, 253. Should the defense possibly
be available only to prevent recovery of the excess over that which would
have been charged had there been no law violation? Such an approach
would deny court aid to reap the fruits of illegality but still require a
buyer to pay for what he keeps. It would involve no more speculative determinations than those now approved in treble damage actions. Cf. Bigelow v.
R. I. 0. Radio Pictures, (1946) 327 U. S. 251, 66 S. Ct. 574, Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., (1927) 273 U. S.359, 47 S.Ct.
400; Goldman Theatres v. Loew's, (E.D. Pa. 1946) 69 F Supp. 103. The
majority of the Court avoided a similar issue in Bruce's Juices v. American
Can Co., (1947) 67 S.Ct. 1015 considered infra pp. 542-49.
SoSee 212 U. S. at 261, 262.
8
7See 212 U. S. at 272.
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case, but adding the other illegal elements was enough to make
any part of the agreement unenforceable. This, again, involves
the problem of separating legal from illegal elements of a contract, 8
and the dissent suggests that the decision is contrary to the conclusion in the CincinattPacket case.89 This aspect of the case will
be considered at a later point."
Intervening between the Wall Paper case and the third major
decision was a clear-cut holding in the Dr Miles case,"- in which
the rule that an illegal contract would not be enforced was applied
to a resale price maintenance contract held to violate the Sherman
Act. The Court refused to enjoin the defendant from inducing plaintiff's dealers to violate their contracts not to sell below agreed
prices. Though the defendant was not a party to the contract, the
violator was seeking court aid to make the contract effective by
enjoining interference with it. Obviously the same result would
have been reached had the plaintiff sought to enforce the contract
against a dealer.9 2 No member of the Court questioned the soundness of recognizing the illegality as a defense, though Mr Justice
Holmes dissented to the holding that the contract violated the
Sherman Act.
The third major case was Wilder Manitfacturvig Co. v. Corn
Products Co.,9 3 decided in 1915. That was an action in a state
court for the amount due for glucose sold and delivered to defendant. The defendant tried to bring the case within the principle
of the Wall Paper case by alleging that the plaintiff, the seller,
was a combination of glucose manufacturers, and that the defendant
had bought the glucose "in execution of" 94 a contract by which a
rebate was to be paid if all glucose requirements were obtained
from the plaintiff.9 5 It added the further defense that each pur8

8See supra p. 521.
89See 212 U. S. at 269.
90
9

See infra pp. 539-40. The majority did not mention this factor.

'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., (1911) 220 U. S. 373, 31
S. Ct. 376. Cf. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, (1908) 210 U. S.339, 28 S.Ct.
722 (copyright gives no power to dictate resale price of book by attached
notice) , Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, (1913) 229 U. S.1, 33 S.Ct. 616 (same
for patent) , Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., (1917) 243 U. S. 490,
37 S.Ct. 412 (same)
92So held in Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., (1918) 246
U. S.8, 38 S.Ct. 257
93(1915) 236 U. S. 165, 35 S.Ct. 398.
94
See Transcript of Record, p. 21, where counsel used the very words
italicized by Mr. Justice Harlan in the Wall Paper case. See 212 U. S. at

261.

95Counsel had to stretch the facts to allege a contract here, as all plaintiff
had done was to offer a "profit sharing" rebate on 1906 purchases if the
defendant purchased its glucose requirements exclusively from plaintiff
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chase contract provided the goods were sold for consumption and
not for resale. The Court sustained the state court's action in
striking this defense from the answer.
Chief Justice White, writing for a unanimous Court, distinguished the Wall Paper case on the ground that the decision
there "was rested exclusively upon the elements of illegality mhering in the particular contract of sale" on which the action was
based. 6 On the other hand, he ruled that in the Wilder case the
contract for rebate (if any) and the proviso that the glucose was
not for resale were "intrinsically legal" and the defendant would
not be permitted to establish their illegality by showing their use by
an illegal combination to accomplish forbidden results. 7 Then,
ostensibly to explain why defendant could not rely upon the illegal
purposes and activities of the combination to establish the illegality
of th contract, 98 the Chief Justice advanced a new and broad
ground for excluding violations of the anti-trust laws as a defense
in private actions.
This new ground was the broad ruling that the Sherman Act
provided comprehensive remedies for its enforcement and these
excluded the" right of individuals to enforce the Act or of the
Courts to entertain complaints of its violation except by the
remedies provided in the act.99 Two reasons were advanced for
this conclusion: (1) The "familiar doctrine" that
"where a statute creates a new offense and denounces the
penalty, or gives a new right and declares the remedy, the punishment or the remedy can be only that which the statute prescribes." ' "
(2) To permit an individual to assert the illegality of a combination in its suit to enforce an otherwise legal right would destroy
the powers conferred on the Attorney-General to enforce the Sherman Act and frustrate the remedies it creates. 101
The first reason had been suggested by Mr. Justice Brewer in
during 1907. See 236 U. S. at 170. There was no allegation of acceptance
of this offer by compliance or otherwise. Indeed, failure to comply with the
condition in a similar offer for 1908 was expressly admitted. See 236 U. S.
at 178. Briefs of counsel were pointed to the technical question as to whether
there was such a contract. See Brief for Plaintiff, p. 22; Reply Brief toi
Defendant, p. 8; Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 9-10. These technicalities were swept aside by the decision denying the defense regardless of the
contract's existence.
9GSee 236 U. S. at 177
97See
236 U. S. at 173, 177
98
See 236 U. S. at 173.
99
See 236 U. S. at 173-4.
20oSee 236 U. S. at 174-5, quoting from Farmers' and Mechanics' Nat.
Bank0 v. Dearing, (1875) 91 U. S.29, 35.
' 'See 236 U. S. at 175-6.
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a separate dissenting opinion in the Wall Paper case, in which he
would have applied the dogma as an inexorable rule of law 102 The
dogma had taken form in a series of Supreme Court cases involving the National Currency Act where the problems were somewhat analogous to the problem here, 10 3 but it was not so ironclad as to compel its application in all cases.104 Indeed, the Court's
discretion to apply or reject the dogma as it saw fit was demonstrated in the Wilder opinion itself which recognized the availability of the defense where the contract itself violated the Act
as in the Wall Paper case. 105 No particular emphasis was placed
upon the doctrine, as it was merely stated in one sentence.
Chief justice White's primary emphasis was laid upon his
second reason that to permit a private individual to assert such a
defense would bring about "destruction of the powers conferred"
and "frustration of the remedies" provided by the Sherman Act.o ° 1
This, he says, is "apparent" because the power of the AttorneyGeneral to put an end to the illegal existence of the combination
for all purposes, and so to protect the public, is "incompatible"
'o2See Continental Wall Paper Co. v Voight & Sons Co., 212 U. S.
227, 273, 29 S. Ct. 280.
' 03 Prior to the National Currency Act cases the dogma had been announced as follows in denying the right of a depositor to recover his entire
deposit in an individual action against a stockholder of a closed bank.
Pollard v. Bailey, (U.S. 1875) 20 Wall. 520, 527
A general liability created by statute without a remedy may be
enforced by an appropriate common law action. But where the provision for liability is coupled with a provision for a special remedy, that
remedy, and that alone, must be employed.
The National Currency Act of 1864 provided that if usurious interest were
charged, the entire interest called for by a note would be forfeited, and if
usurious interest had been paid, twice the amount of the interest paid could
be recovered in an action of debt. (1864) 13 Stat. at L. 99, 108. This was
first held not to justify the pleading of usury as a defense to an action for
the principal. Farmers' and Mechanics Nat. Bank v. Dearing, (1875) 91
U. S. 29; cf. Oates v. National Bank, (1880) 100 U. S. 239. Later, on the
same theory, the statute was held not to authorize pleading by way of setoff that the usurious interest already paid exceeded the amount due on the
principal, instead, double damages must be recovered by a special action of
debt brought under the statute. Barnet v. National Bank, (1879) 98 U. S.
555. 04
See Stewart v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., (1897) 168 U. S. 445, 18
S. Ct. 105, Tenn. Coal, Iron and R. R. Co. v. George, (1914) 233 U. S.
354, 34 S.Ct. 587, cf. United States v. Babcock, (1919) 250 U. S.328, 331,
39 S. Ct. 464. In the Stewart case Mr. Justice Brewer wrote the opinion
ruling that the doctrine should not be applied to prevent the personal
representative of the deceased, killed in Maryland, from bringing an action
in the District of Columbia on a Maryland wrongful death statute which
provided that such actions must be brought by and in the name of the
state 0of Maryland.
10 5See 236 U. S. at 172, 177
1 6See 236 U. S. at 175.

VIOLATION OF ANTI-TRUST LAWS

with the power of the individual to assert the combination's illegal
existence. But the latter power would not destroy the former. The
mere failure m the private action to enjoin further activities of the
combination would not, as the Chief Justice suggests, put the
combination in "possession of authority to violate the law" or
purge it of its illegal character. The expressly authorized treble
damage action would have the same identical effect, or lack of
effect, on the Attorney-General's powers as would application of
the defense. Nor could recognition of the defense in the state courts
"defeat the jurisdiction" of the federal courts to enforce the law,
as suggested by the Chief justice. The Attorney-General could
still proceed in the federal courts with all public remedies against
an offender regardless of the outcome of an action for the price of
goods sold by the offending corporation.
Despite this obscure reasoning, it is clear that the Chief Justice
here gave expression with characteristic vigor to a conviction that
the public aspects of anti-trust enforcement are the important ones
and that the Court should confine private enforcement to the
statutory remedies. Possibly he was thinking of the danger of
dogging the federal courts with anti-trust trials which would
accomplish no useful purpose, but he does not say so. He may have
visualized abundant confusion if state courts were permitted to
interpret the anti-trust laws, but the reasons he gave barred the
defense in federal as well as state courts. Possibly he believed that
trial of anti-trust violation in a private suit might occasionally
handicap the Department of Justice in a pending or planned action
it was not yet ready to try. This objection is hardly valid, however, in view of the express authority for private treble damage
actions and private actions for injunction without prior consent
07
by the Attorney General.1
It seems more likely that the key to this muddy but far-reaching
paragraph'0 8 is found at the very end. There the Chief Justice
concludes that
'0 7 The private remedy by injunction was added by Section 16 of the

Clayton Act in 1914. See (1914) 38 Stat. at L. 737, (1940) 15 U. S. C. § 26.
While this was not in effect at the time of the lower court decision, it would
seem proper for the Court to consider it in weighing the future effect of a
contemplated decision.
108Not only did this case settle the limits of the defense of anti-trust
violation for over 25 years, but this paragraph also established for other
purposes the doctrine that the remedies provided by the Anti-Trust Acts
are exclusive. See, e.g., Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., (1921)
254 U. S.590, 593, 41 S.Ct. 209; General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore &
M. S. Ry., (1922) 260 U. S. 261, 286, 43 S. Ct 106, United States v.
Cooper Corp., (1941) 312 U. S. 600, 604, 61 S.Ct. 742.
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"
the possibility of the wrong to be brought about by allowing the property to be obtained under a contract of sale without
enforcing the duty to pay for it, not upon the ground of the illegality of the contract of sale but of the illegal organization of the seller,
may have operated to confine the right to question the legal
existence of the corporation or combination to public authority
sanctioned by the sense of public responsibility and not to leave it
to individual action prompted it may be by purely selfish motives."' 10
Here, again, emerges the conflict between encouraging compliance
with the anti-trust laws by denying court aid in reaping fruits of
violation as against preventing rascals from escaping their obligations to pay for what they have bought. 1 Here, where the sales
contract itself is found to be legal, the latter consideration is held
to be controlling, but only one of the judges who had found the
former consideration controlling in the Wall Paper case were still
on the Court."'
Reverting to the considerations suggested in connection with
the Connolly case as possible reasons for limiting the defense,"'
we find the first two emerging as important factors in the Wilder
case
(1) The Court expressly emphasizes the undesirability of
a windfall to the buyer and indicates that such windfalls will be
confined to cases where the contract itself is illegal.
(2) The Court takes the position that the remedies expressly provided by Congress are adequate and exclusive, although
the opinion appears to recognize an exception to this rule where
the contract itself violates the anti-trust laws.
(3) There is no suggestion that the Court was cognizant of
the legislative history indicating Congressional lack of enthusiasm for the defense,"'3 though the passage last quoted appears
to indicate that the Chief Justice suspected the defense may
have been deliberately omitted from the Act." 4 Had this point
been pursued, the Court might have found support for its decision in the failure of Congress to incorporate the defense in
the Clayton Act in 1914 after the Court had limited the defense
to contracts themselves illegal." 5
'09See 236 U. S. at 176.
"10See supra pp. 522-23.
"'-Of the majority deciding the Wall Paper case only Mr. Justice Day
remained.

"12See supra pp. 519-20.
"'See
supra pp. 508-12.
"14 The Chief Justice here was obviously referring to sanctions provided
in the Sherman Act.
"'5See supra pp. 511, 516-17 It should be remembered, however, that the
last decision prior to the adoption of the Clayton Act was the Wall Paper case.
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(4) There is no open recognition of the undesirability of
a mass of collateral evidence relating to anti-trust violations in
a simple suit on a contract. However, appreciation of this factor may possibly be indicated by the very ruling itself which
confines the defense to contracts inherently illegal and excludes
consideration of collateral conspiracies and improper use of
contracts to demonstrate their illegality.1" 6
Whatever may have motivated the Court, its decision in the
Wilder case made it plain that the broader implications of the
Wall Paper opinion would not be followed and the defense would
be confined to contracts themselves illegal. Indeed, the exclusive remedies reasoning in the Wilder opinion suggested to some
that possibly the Wall Paper and Dr. Miles cases would be considered overruled and the defense not recognized in any case."
This possibility seemed foreclosed when the Court applied the
defense to defeat a resale price maintenance contract in 1918ii8
and a contract violating Section 3 of the Clayton Act in 1922.i10
While neither opinion cited the Wilder case, or referred to the
exclusive remedy doctrine, the possible conflict was reconciled
as follows in 1925"
"It is only where the invalidity is inherent in the contract that
the Act may be interposed as a defense. With that exception the
remedies
which the Act provides for violations of it are exclu20
sive."
Since that date the Supreme Court has applied the defense on
three occasions to contracts violating the anti-trust laws. 21
Doctrinally, Siall Co. v,.
Lamborn & Co."- was simply another
case enforcing a collateral contract made by a member of an illegal
price-fixing combination with a stranger to the combination. Practically, it was distinguishable from the Wilder and Connolly cases
which had intimated the defense might be given a much broader scope than
first indicated in the Connolly case. See supra p. 523.
"16Whether this limitation may possibly go so far as to deny the defense
unless the contract in invalid on its face is considered mfra pp. 540-41.
11'See Note (1915) 28 Harv. L. Rev. 691, 692-3. But cf. McLaughlin,
Cases on the Federal Anti-Trust Laws (1933) 572, n. 180.
2l8Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., (1918) 246 U. S. 8,
38 S. 9Ct. 257 (applied Dr. Miles ruling to patented product).
"1 Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., (1922) 258 U. S. 346,
42 S.
Ct. 360.
20
See Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., (1925) 267 U. S.248, 252. This was
dictum,
21 as the contract involved was found to be collateral to the illegality.
1 Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Co., (1942) 317 U. S. 173, 63 S. Ct 172;
Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., (1947) 67 S. Ct 416; MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., (1947) 67 S. Ct 421. These cases
are considered infra pp. 531-41.
22(1925) 267 U. S. 248, 45 S. Ct. 300.
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on the ground that defendant was not seeking to retain a product
without paying for it. In an action for breach of contract, plaintiff
sought to recover the difference between the contract price and
the price he had obtained on the market for sugar defendant had
refused to accept. In answer, defendant alleged that plaintiff entered
into a combination with others to create a false appearance of a sigar
shortage and to sell at an excessive agreed price. Defendant, misled
by the conspiracy, contracted to buy sugar at that excessive price
and paid for all sugar it accepted, but refused to accept the undelivered balance after the true market conditions were known and
market prices had dropped. 2 The Supreme Court affirmed a
federal district court order sustaining a demurrer to this defense.
In the Supreme Court, counsel for defendant urged that plaintiff should be denied judicial aid in its efforts to reap the fruits of
its illegal price-fixing agreement since the "undelivered part of the
contracts is wholly executory and defendant has received nothlng "124 In rejecting the defense, the Court did not even advert
to this argument. Instead, it reasoned that the contracts to purchase sugar were not "in themselves invalid under the Anti-Trust
Act, but only * * * collateral to a combination prohibited by it,"

and hence were enforceable under the doctrine of the Conolli and
Wilder cases. Apparently to distinguish the Wall Paper decision,
the Court added that defendant was not a party to the illegal combination and had purchased the sugar without any restrictions on
1his right to resell it. '
This series of cases appears, then, to culminate in a strictly
formal rule which confines the defense to cases in which the plaintiff seeks to enforce the contract against a party to the conspiracy 12" So long as defendant is only a victim, with no obligations to the conspirators except to pay the illegally enhanced price,
the seller can invoke the aid of the court to enforce his unwarranted profit even though his victim refuses to accept delivery
upon learning of the conspiracy Necessarily, this last decision appears to negative any significance which might be attached to the
weight given in the Wilder opinion and the strong dissent in the
12The defense is summarized very briefly in the opinion. For a more detailed statement of the defense see Transcript of Record, pp. 9, 29-30.
124See Brief for Plaintiff In Error, p. 10.
125See
267 U. S. at 252.
"26Reference to the absence of restrictions on the defendant's right to
resell as it might choose implies that the Court considered the dofense still
available to a minor party to the conspiracy, such as a buyer who agrees to
maintain resale prices dictated by the combination. But see Sinclair Ref.
Co. v. Wilson Gas & Oil Co., (W.D. S.C. 1931) 52 F (2d) 974, 975 (defense available between major parties to conspiracy only)
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Wall Papercase to the injustice of permitting a buyer to retain his
purchase without paying for It.1 2 7 Instead, by its cryptic conclusion
that except where the "invalidity is inherent in the contract" the
remedies provided by the act "are exclusive,"'12 the Small Co.
opinion appears to rest this line of cases on the second consideration mentioned above-the adequacy and exclusiveness of the express remedies provided by Congress. 2 9
From 1925 to 1942 violation of the anti-trust laws was not
raised as a defense in any Supreme Court decision. The exclusive
remedy doctrine and the collateral contract rule appeared to have
set at rest most uncertainties concerning the scope of the defense,
though its repeated and usually futile assertion in the lower federal
courts' 30 might be thought to reflect basic dissatisfaction with the
narrow limits within which it had been confined. In 1942 two
decisions, one on patent infringement'' and the other on a patent
licensing agreement, gave new life to the defense.
Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Co. s" was an action by the holder
"1'Cf.supra pp. 520, 522-23, 528.
"2SSee
267 U. S. at 252.
"29See supra pp. 520, 528.

"30 From 1925 to 1942 the defense was denied in the following cases
involving contracts. Milliken-Tomlinson Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co.,
(C.C.A. 1st 1925) 9 F (2d) 809 (same as Small Co. case), Sinclair Ref.

Co. v. Wilson Gas and Oil Co., (W.D. S.C. 1931) 52 F (2d) 974 (action

for price of goods sold by member of combination using defendant to
market product), Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co., (D.
Colo. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 873 (illegal arbitration clause severable from balance
of film exhibition contract), Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v.National
Theatre Corp., (C.C.A. 4th 1931) 49 F (2d) 64 (same), Stanley Co. v.
Lagomarsino, (S.D. N.Y. 1931) 53 F (2d) 112 (enforced ancillary covenant
not to compete though part of scheme to acquire monopoly) , Gasoline
Products Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., (S.D. Maine 1931) 46 F (2d) 511
(patent royalties on collateral licensing agreement recoverable though fixed
by "illegal" agreement among competitors; later held valid agreement in suit
by government. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, (1931) 283 U. S. 163,
51 S.Ct 421), Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Webster Basket Co., (C.C.A.
2d 1936) 82 F. (2d) 245 (royalties recoverable from manufacturing licensee
despite contract provisions interpreted by licenser to give authority to
dictate resale prices, not complied with by licensee), cf. Barnsdall Ref.
Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., (E.D. Wis. 1940) 32 F Supp. 314 (in
action for price, counterclaim for treble damages for discrimination denied
because defense not available on that ground). Defense allowed in the
following- Fox Film Corp. v. C. & M. Amusement Co., (S.D. Ohio 1932)
58 F (2d) 337 (contra to film cases cited above), Sbicca-Del Mac Co. v.
Milius Shoe Co., (D. Mass. 1940) 36 F Supp. 623 (Action for royalties
may be defeated if defendant proves licensing agreement was part of conspiracy to pool patents and restrain competition). The largely futile host
of cases asserting the defense in patent, trademark and copyright infringement cases are cited infra note 226.
"3'Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., (1942) 314 U. S. 488, 62 S. CL
402, considered, infra pp. 554-56.
132(1942) 317 U. S.173, 63 S.Ct 172.
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of a patent against a licensee authorized to manufacture and sell
transformers covered by the patent. The owner sought to collect
unpaid royalties and to enjoin violation of a provision by which
the licensee agreed not to sell the transformers for less than the
prices prescribed by the patent holder. Such a price agreement by
a manufacturing licensee was lawful under accepted doctrine,'
but defendant pleaded that the patent was invalid and hence the
price agreement violated the Sherman Act and was not enforceable. The lower courts ruled that having accepted a license under
the patent, the licensee was estopped to deny its validity
The Supreme Court reversed those decisions and ruled unammously that the traditional estoppel rule331 must yield to the
policy of the Sherman Act which "in the public interest precludes
the enforcement of such unlawful agreements." Therefore, the
licensee could assert the illegality of the price fixing agreement,
and "may offer any competent evidence to establish its illegality,
including proof of the invalidity of the patent." 3 ' In its opinion
the Court stated the holding in the Wall Paper case with apparent
approval. The implications of the Sola decision are best considered in connection with two 1947 cases which carried the defense
of illegality one step beyond the explicit ruling in the Sola case
to defeat actions for royalties because the licenses also called for
price fixing.
133 Bement v National Harrow Co., (1902) 186 U. S. 70, 22 S. Ct.
747, United States v. General Electric Co., (1926) 272 U S.476, 47 S. Ct.
192. For a discussion of the limitations and possibly uncertain future of
this doctrine see Steffen, Invalid Patents and Price Control, (1946) 56 Yale
L. Jr. 1, 2-6. The Department of Justice has urged the Court, when necessary, to overrule the Bement and General Electric cases and eliminate all
patentee control over a licensee's selling price. See Brief for the United
States, pp. 44-61, United States v. Univis Lens Co., (1942) 316 U. S.241,
62 S. Ct. 1088. The Court did not find occasion to pass on tils question.
See 316 U. S. at 252. Early in 1947 the Bement and General Electric cases
were approved by four dissenting justices in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter who took pains to point out that Mr. Justice Brandeis, alert
though he was to prevent "undue extension of the patent monopoly," had
participated in and subsequently cited with approval the General Electric
decision. See MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. and Mfg. Co.. (U.S. 1947)
67 S.Ct. 421, 426-27, considered infra pp. 533-41. Such pains on a point admittedly not questioned in the case suggests possible fortification against a
felt.
future
134attack on the outcome of which no great assurance was
Ever since 1856 the Supreme Court had assumed that a licensee could
not challenge the validity of a patent. See e.g., Kinsman v Parkhurst, (U.S.
1856) 18 How. 289, 293, United States v. Harvey Steel Co., (1905) 196
U. S.310, 317, 25 S.Ct. 240. A "* * * weighty body of cases affirmed and
applied that doctrine with rare unanimity," as did also the authors on
patent law. See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter ii MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., (1947) 67 S.Ct. 421, 424, where
are summarized.
the authorities
' 35 See 317 U S. at 177
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Both the Katzhtger436 and the MacGregor3 7 cases were actions by patent holders against licensees to collect royalties for
products manufactured pursuant to licensing agreements. In both
cases the license agreement contained a price fixing provision but
in neither case did the plaintiff seek to enforce that provision. 13
In each case the defendant contended that the patent was invalid,
making the price fixing provision illegal, which, it was claimed,
made the entire licensing agreement illegal and unenforceable. In
the lower courts, opposite results were reached in the two cases
because of opposing views as to the severability of the price fixing
from the royalty provisions. 39 Having granted certiorari because
of the conflict, the Supreme Court sustained the defense in both
cases by five to four decisions;
The Court's reasoning

40

may be outlined as follows

(1) The Sola case held that rules of estoppel cannot screen
price fixing agreements from court scrutiny, and in the public
interest the federal courts must keep the way open to challenge
the validity of patents utilized for price fixing.1'4
(2) The Sola case further held that in case the patent were
found invalid, neither the4 2 price fixing nor the royalty agreements could be enforced.
(3) Had the Sola case left open the severability of the
royalty from the price fixing agreement we would again arrive
at the same conclusion, 43 and "we hold that the covenant to pay
'36Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., (1947) 67 S. Ct. 416.
'.3MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., (1947) 67 S. Ct. 421.
138fn the Katzmger case there was no possibility that the provision
would have future effect, for the entire license agreement had been terminated, and the action was to recover royalties for items manufactured
prior to its termination. See 67 S. Ct. at 418, 420.
139See 67 S. Ct. at 419, 423.
4
3. OThe Court's reasons appear primarily in the Katznger opinion, on
the authority of which the MacGregor case was decided the same day. The
following page references relate to the Katzmger opinion except as indicated. A single dissenting opinion was written appearing under the caption
of both cases. See 67 S. Ct. 424.
141See 67 S. Ct. 419. This ruling was applied in the Katzinger case
the validity of the patent.
despite
4 an express agreement not to contest
2
-See
67 S. Ct. 419-20. The minority protested strongly against this
interpretation of the Sola case, urging that though a claim for royalties
was made in the case the sole issue to which the Court's attention wvas
directed, and which it decided, was the enforcibility of the price-fixing provisions. See 67 S. Ct. at 425. Since the majority also ruled independently
and explicitly on the separability issue in the Katzinger and MacGregor
cases, this conflict on the inferences to fie drawn on the royalty issue from the
Sola decision appears to warrant no further consideration.
143See 67 S. Ct. at 420.
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royalties was not severable from the covenant to sell at fixed
prices.

144

It should be noted that the reason for refusing to enforce the
royalty provision was not the invalidity of the patent, and hence the
absence of any basis for a royalty No such argument was suggested,
and there was no intimation in the majority opinions that in the
absence of price fixing provisions the licensee could escape his
obligation to pay royalties by challenging the validity of the patent.
Instead, the decisions were based squarely on the ground that the
royalty provisions were unenforceable because inseparable from
the illegal price fixing provisions.
In the dissenting opinion by Mr Justice Frankfurter the
minority of four seemed primarily concerned with the inroads
made on the ninety year old doctrine that a licensee under a patent
is estopped from challenging its validity In the Sola case the Court
had unanimously approved an exception to that doctrine when
the issue was enforcement of a price-fixing provision which violated the Sherman Act if the patent were invalid, but the dissenters
could not agree that the same considerations required denial of the
estoppel doctrine when the only issue was collection of royalties.
Only in a footnote are any doubts raised about the severability
ruling of the majority, 4 ' for the minority's objections went deeper
than that, indicating fear that the estoppel doctrine may have
been "deprived of life" without being given a "decent lblic
4
burial."'1
These three license agreement decisions appear significant in
the following respects bearing on the future scope of the defense
(1) The ruling on severability is more strict than the usual
approach to contracts containing legal and illegal elements, and
appears to reveal an inclination to use the defense as a sanction to discourage aiiti-trust violations, even though the particular relief sought could be given without aiding the viola'44See 67 S. Ct. at 423 (MacGregor opinion)
'45See 67 S.Ct. at 427, n. 6.
146See 67 S.Ct. at 427-28. Compare Mr. Justice Frankfurter's vigorous
dissent in Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., (1945) 326 U. S.249, 258-64,
66 S. Ct. 101, in which the Court made inroads on the analogous doctrine
estopping an assignor from challenging a patent to the detriment of his
assignee. Repeated citation of the Scott Paper case in the majority opinions,
plus reliance upon that case as demonstrating a public interest in keeping
the competitive economy free from invalid patents (See 67 S.Ct. at 420),
may have stimulated the minority's doubt as to whether "the doctrine of
estoppel has or has not survived." See 67 S.Ct. at 427, Note (1947) 47 Col. L.
Rev. 477

VIOLATION OF ANTI-TRUST LAPWS

tion. This may foreshadow further limitations on the exclusive
remedy doctrine.
(2) In its practical aspects, this ruling broadens the possible scope of the defense as applied to contracts containing
elements which violated the anti-trust laws.
(3) The decisions negative any possible implication of the
Wilder case that the defense might be confined to contracts
invalid on their face.

(1)

The formal reason given for holding the royalty provisions
not severable from the price fixing provisions of the license agreement was far from compelling"Metallic's obligation to pay the royalties and its agreement
to sell at prices fixed by Katzinger constituted an integrated consideration for the license grant. Consequently, when one part of
the consideration is unenforceable because in violation of the
law, its integrated companion must go with it. See Ha-elton v.
Sleckels, 202 U. S.71, 78, 26 S. Ct. 567 . ,,x-The rule stated by the Court would be properly applied to an
executory contract in which A has agreed to perform a legal act in
exchange for two acts by B, one legal and the other illegal. In such
a case A is not obligated to perform because the full consideration
for which he bargained cannot be furnished, nor is B obligated to
perform, since he cannot rely upon A's performance. 48 That was
the situation involved in the Hazelton case, 49 the only authority
cited by the Court on this point. But the usual rule is otherwise
where, as here, the contract is fully executed on its legal side and
B has promised in exchange two acts, one legal, the other illegal.
The full legal consideration having already been furnished by A,
whether on a unilateral contract or a bilateral contract fully performed on its legal side, A is entitled to insist upon performance
of the legal consideration by B even though he may not require
the illegal.1 50 Not only had the Supreme Court previously recognized the enforceability of the legal consideration -when the full
147 See 67 S. Ct at 420.
4

UsSee Williston, Contracts § 1782; Restatement, Contracts § 607, comment 49
a; Note (1934) 33 Mich. L. Rev. 278, 282, 283.
1 Hazelton v. Sheckells, (1906) 202 U. S. 71, 26 S. Ct. 567 There A
agreed to sell property to B in consideration of (a) $9000 and (b) illegal
services m influencing Congressional action. It was held that B could not
enforce the contract by compelling a conveyance by A, though lie had
rendered
the illegal services and tendered the $9,000.
150 See Williston, Contracts § 1779, 1782; Restatement, Contracts (1932)
§ 607, Comment a; Note (1934) 33 Mich. L. Rev. 278, 284, Rogers, Void,
Illegal or Unenforceable Consideration, (1908) 17 Yale L. Jr. 338, 343-44.
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consideration on the other side had been furnished,15 but in the
Cincmnatz Packet case had actually reached that result in a case
involving an alleged Sherman Act violation and quite analogous
1 2
on this issue to the Katzinger and MacGregor cases. 1
The Cincinnati,Packet case, and the usual rule applied to contracts partially invalid on one side but fully performed on the
legal side, made readily available to the Court a doctrine by which
it could easily have held the royalty provisions severable from the
price provisions had it desired that result. On the other hand, such
a result was not compelled by the authorities, for the normal rules as
to severability had previously yielded to considerations of public
interest where denial of all relief under the contract would promote a public policy of greater importance than enforcement of
private rights."5 ' Thus, the courts had ruled that where the contract required conduct malum in se or grossly immoral, 4 or where
the entire contract was for an illegal purpose"' though embodying
"5'Gelpcke v. Dubuque, (U.S. 1864) 1 Wall. 221, McCullough v.
Virginia, (1898) 172 U. S. 102, 114-16, 19 S. Ct. 134, cf. American Ry.
Express v. Lindenburg, (1923) 260 U. S. 584, 590, 43 S. Ct. 206.
152Cjncinnati Packet Co. v. Bay, (1906) 200 U. S. 179, 26 S. Ct. 208,
considered supra pp. 520-21. In the Cincinnati Packet case defendant had
received full performance from plaintiff, he had the ships. In the Katzinger
and MacGregor cases, defendants had received full performance from plaintiffs, pursuant to the patent they had manufactured products for which
royalties were sought. In the former case plaintiff sought the agreed price
only, making no effort to enforce the rate agreement claimed to violate the
Sherman Act. In these later cases, plaintiffs sought the agreed royalty
only, making no effort to enforce the price agreements. In the Cincinnati
Packet case the Court questioned whether the Sherman Act was involved,
but ruled that even if interstate commerce were involved the illegality of
the rate agreement would not defeat an action for the price. While the
opinion is cryptic, the viewpoint of the court is reflected by the citation
of Pigots Case, (1614) 11 Co. Rep. 26b, 77 Eng. Repr. 1177, the leading case
on severability, and Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, (U.S. 1873)
20 Wall. 64, a leading Supreme Court case on the severability of legal from
illegal provisions in restraint of trade where ancillary to a sale.
"'sSee
Note (1934) 33 Mich. L. Rev. 278, 279-82.
4
35 See Gelpke v. Dubuque, (U.S. 1864) 1 Wall. 221, 222, McCullough
v. Virginia, (1898) 172 U. S. 102, 115, 19 S. Ct. 134, cf. Hanauer v. Doane,
(U.S. 1871) 12 Wall. 342. 346.
155Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper and Fiber Co., (1919) 168 Wis.
400, 170 N. W 230 (Purpose. to restrict competition in spruce in violation
of Sherman Act, otherwise legal provisions as to hemlock not enforceable),
Santa Clara Valley etc. Co. v. Hayes, (1888) 76 Cal. 387, 18 Pac. 391 (Purpose. to limit production and increase price of lumber in common law
restraint of trade, no part of contract enforceable) , Buckelew v. Martens,
(1931) 108 N. J. L. 339, 156 At. 436 (Agreement to fix prices contrary to
state law; subsidiary agreement not to use solicitors not enforceable) , Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. v. Northwestern Fuel Co., (C.C. Minn. 1887) 31
Fed. 652 (Purpose: discrimmatorv freight rates to secure monopoly, no
part enforceable) , Manson v. Curtis, (1918) 223 N. Y 313, 119 N. E. 559
(Purpose. to remove control of corporation from directors, subordinate
agreement, innocent in itself, not enforceable).
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some legal elements, such illegality tainted the entire contract so
as to make it unenforceable though formally severable. 158
Whether that qualification on formal severability rules should
apply to violation of the anti-trust laws was an open question. The
Cincinnati Packet case had considered a rate-fixing violation, if
any, severable from an agreement to pay the price, and had stressed
the importance of the private obligations of the parties. The Wall
Papercase, on the other hand, had defeated an action for the price
of goods sold when the contract had provided for resale price
maintenance and exclusive dealing and had stressed the deterrent
effect of defeating recovery. But the Wall Paper opinion had not
considered the severability issue, and was easily distinguishable on
the ground that the entire sales contract had for its object the
accomplishment of an illegal plan to acquire a monopoly. 0 7 When
the main purpose was legal, lower courts had usually held contract
provisions violating state'5" and federal' 80 anti-trust laws severable from legal provisions, and this was the prevailing view on
contracts in restraint of trade at common law. 6* Therefore, the
Court was free in this case to choose between enforcing private
legal rights, or refusing to do so as a sanction to enforce compliance with the anti-trust policy against price restrictions. It chose
the latter course.
After stating the vulnerable formal rule quote above, the Court
gave its real reason for the result reached
"Moreover, solicitude for the interest of the public fostered
' 5 GSee Williston, Contracts § 1779; Note (1934) 33 Mich. L. Rev.

278, 280;
Rogers, supra note 338.
' 57See 212 U. S. at 261. Cf. cases cited supra note 155.
"'SMcCall Co. v. Hughes, (1912) 102 Miss. 375, 59 So. 794 (resale price
maintenance and exclusive dealing clause violating state law does not
defeat recovery for price). But cf. Fuqua v. Pabst Brewing Co., (1897) 90
Tex. 298, 32 S. W 29, 750 (statute made analogous contract "absolutely
void;" 9 no recovery for price).
15 Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. National Theaters Corp., (C.C.A.
4th 1931) 49 F. (2d) 64; Columbia Pictures Corp. v. BiMetallic Inv. Co,
(D. Colo. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 873, Fox Film Corp. v. Buchanan, (1931) 17
La. App. 285, 136 So. 197, Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theater Co, (1932)
82 Utah 279, 17 P (2d) 294. Contra. Fox Film Corp. v. C. & M. Amusement Co., (S.D. Ohio 1932) 58 F (2d) 337, Umversal Film Exchanges v.
West, (1932) 163 Miss. 272, 141 So. 293; United Artists Corp. v. Odeon
Bldg., (1933) 212 Wis. 150, 248 N. W 784. Each of the above cases involved severability of an illegal arbitration clause from the rest of a contract to
license films.
160 0regon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, (U.S. 1873) 20 Vall. 64
(contract not to compete) ; Rawleigh Medical Co. v. Walker, (1917) 16 Ala.
App. 232, 77 So. 70 (illegal resale price maintenance and exclusive dealing
contract held not to bar action for price), see Williston, Contracts, § 1659,
1660.
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by freedom from invalid patents and from restraints of trade,
which has been manifested by the line of decisions of which the
Scott Paper Co. and the Sola case are two of the latest examples,
requires that there be no departure from the guiding principles
they announced."' 161
This reason is incomplete without the Court's previous explanation of the policy back of the Sola case. After pointing out that had
Chief Justice Stone intended to restrict the Sola holding to the
price provisions only, he would have indicated in the opinion or
mandate that they were severable from the royalty provisions, the
Court added
"That decision, instead of resting on such a narrow procedural
base, was firmly grounded upon the broad public interest in freeing
our competitive economy from trade restraints which might be
imposed by price-fixing agreements stemming from narrow or
invalid patents." 1 2
Read in relation to the point at issue, severability of royalty from
price fixing provisions, such language can only mean that the
public interest in freedom of competition from price-fixing arrangements, at least in the case of invalid patents, requires that the
royalty provisions be condemned also as a form of sanction to
enforce the policy against price restraints. This understanding of
the opinion is born out by its subsequent reference to defendant's
challenge of the patent as "a service to the public interest," thus
justifying the defense even though defendant first suggested the
price restriction."6 3
This renewed emphasis on enforcing anti-trust policy by the
defense of illegality raises some question as to the future of the
exclusive remedy dogma as an inexorable rule. 6 4 While these cases
can technically be brought within the exception to that rule as
involving contracts themselves illegal, the court's expressed purpose to defeat enforcement of the legal portions of the contract
"as a service to the public interest" in freeing our competitive
economy from trade restraints imposed by plaintiff'6 6 seems at
war with the basis for the exclusive remedy doctrine. These decisions take on added significance in this regard when considered
in connection with another line of cases,'6 6 originating also in 1942,
recognizing violation of the anti-trust laws as a defense in patent
16'See 67 S. Ct. 420.
l62Ibid.
l63Ibid.
' 64See infra pp. 543, 548.
1655ee 67 S. Ct. at 420.
16 6See infra pp. 552-63.
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infringement actions. Together, these two lines of cases may foreshadow further limitations on the exclusive remedy doctrine.

(2)
The same considerations which dictated the results in the Kat.
zinger and MacGregor cases would seem to apply likewise to contracts containing price restrictions not tied to patents. The policy
against price-fixing is at least as great where there is no patent
as where an invalid patent is claimed, in the former situation the
possible justification of a good faith attempt to protect a patent
is entirely absent. Though the Katamtger opinion mentions the
interest in freedom from invalid patents, it contains no intimation
of a more charitable viewpoint where no patent is claimed. The
opinion stresses the public interest in "freedom from invalid patents
and from restraints of trade" as manifested by a "line of decisions" of which the Scott Paper Co. and Sola cases "are two of the
latest examples.1 167 But the Sola case was the first to involve pricefixing supported by an invalid patent; hence, the prior cases referred to must have been those relating to price fixing alone. Of
these the Wall Paper case was the primary example dealing with
illegality as a defense. The Sola opinion relied upon and restated
the Wall Paper holding to support its ruling on the defense
issue. 68 This subsequent reliance in the Katzinger opinion on the
"line of decisions" represented by the Sola case would appear to
suggest further endorsement of the Wall Paper decision denying
recovery of the price of goods when the contract contained price
fixing and exclusive dealing provisions violating the Sherman Act.
The broader question is whether in the light of the Kazinger,
MacGregor, Sola and Wall Paper cases the Court may now be
expected to defeat an action for the price of goods sold, or for
breach of a contract to buy goods or some other perfectly legal
provision in a contract, when the contract also contains a price
maintenance provision violating the Sherman Act, 69 or an exclusive dealing or tieing clause violating Section 3 of the Clayton
Act, or some other violation of the anti-trust laws. The formal
approach taken by the Court in the Katzinger opinion would, if
167
See 67 S. Ct. at 420 (italics supplied).
16 SSee 317 U. S. at 177
' 69The Miller-Tydings Act, (1937) 50 Stat. at L. 693, (1940) 15 U. S.
Code 1, does not foreclose the possibility of such Sherman Act violations.
See, e.g., United States v. Umvis Lens Co., (1942) 316 U. S. 241, 62 S. Ct.
1088; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., (1944) 321 U. S.707, 724, 64
S. Ct. 805, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 2d
1946) 158 F (2d) 592, cert. denied, (1947) 67 S. Ct. 869.
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followed, lead to the conclusion that the agreement to pay a certain
price for goods and the agreement to resell the goods at a fixed
price constitute an "integrated consideration," requiring that if
the latter is illegal "its integrated companion must go with it." '
Granting that such formalism is not usually applied when the legal
side of the contract has been fully executed"' and may be retracted
in later cases, the policy consideration stressed in the Katzioiger
opinion appears to apply with equal force to any contract containing an illegal provision of such a nature as to constitute a
serious threat to competition. If it chose to do so, the Court could
distinguish the Katzmnger and MacGregor cases as based on the
additional evils of monopoly under invalid patents as well as on
the evils of price control, and distinguish the Wall Paper case as
involving a contract having monopoly as its principal object. Yet
those distinguishing features are simply matters of degree, and
the same principle would seem controlling whenever the public
interest in preserving effective competition from the particular
evil outweighs the interest in enforcement of the related private
rights of anti-trust violators. The significance of these recent
cases lies in the greater weight the Court now appears to be
attaching to enforcement of the anti-trust policy
(3)
While in none of these three cases does the Court depart from
the requirement that the contract itself must be illegal, it does permit the defendant to establish by extrinsic evidence the illegality of
a contract legal on its face. Thus a slightly broader meaning was
given to the Wilder and Small Co. requirement that the anti-trust
violation must be "inherent in the contract"1 1 than might have
been given had the Court not been sympathetic to the defense.
In all of the cases theretofore applying the defense to antitrust violations the illegality had actually appeared in the contract itself.1 3 After the Wilder and Small Co. decisions, two
17oSee 67 S. Ct. at 420.
1
'See supra pp. 535-36.
172See
supra pp. 525, 529.
1 1
73 n all but the Wall Paper case the illegality not only appeared in the
contracts, but was the very clause vainly relied upon by plaintiffs to establish their case. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., (1911) 220
U. S. 373, 31 S. Ct. 376, considered supra p. 524, Boston Store v. American
Graphophone Co., (1918) 246 U. S. 8, 38 S. Ct. 257, cited supra p. 529
Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., (1922) 258 U. S. 346,
42 S. Ct. 360, cited supra p. 529. In the Wall Paper case the sales and unpaid accounts relied upon by plaintiff were alleged by defendant to have
been made pursuant to a contract which on its face called for illegal resale
price maintenance. See supra p. 521.
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lower courts denied the defense by stressing the absence of illegality on the face of the contract though they did not explicitly
indicate that the defense required the contract itself to reveal
the illegality. 174 To so require would be contrary to several earlier
Supreme Court cases not involving the anti-trust laws which applied the defense of illegality though the illegality appeared neither
on the face of the contract nor in plaintiff's proof of his case."
The reference in the Connolly opinion to plaintiff's ability to prove
his case without the illegality appearing was directed to demonstrate the collateral nature of the illegality, 76 not the necessity that
it must appear as a part of plaintiff's case to constitute a defense.
Plaintiff's inability to prove his case without showing illegality
would seem sound as one affirmative test to establish the defense,
but his ability to prove his case without such showing is not dependable as a negative test to defeat the defense. 7 There is a vast
difference between barring plaintiff because he has revealed illegality in proving his case, and refusing to permit defendant to show
that a contract valid on its face is, in fact, illegal due to extrinsic
facts not appearing in the contract.
Any doubts on this score should have been put to rest by the
Sola, Katzinger and Westinghou.se cases. In each case the license
contract requiring a manufacturing licensee to sell the patented
product at prices stipulated by the patentee was perfectly valid
on its face, but the Court permitted the illegality to be shown by
going outside the contract to prove the invalidity of the patent.17 8
Surely the same result will be reached when the invalidity of the
contract can be shown by other extraneous facts, such as a showing that a resale price maintenance contract apparently valid under
the Miller-Tydings amendment is actually invalid because the
price has been dictated to the producer by a horizontal combination of distributors.'- 9 To hold otherwise would sacrifice substance
-74 See Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., (D. Maine
1931) 46 F. (2d) 511, 514, Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, (S.D. N.Y. 1931)
53 F (2d) 112, 114.-But cf. Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Webster Basket
Co., (C.C.A. 2d 1936) 82 F (2d) 245, 246 where the court pointed out
that in the absence of proof that unlawful performance was intended a
contract
valid on its face would be enforced.
175 Hanauer v. Doane, (U.S. 1871) 12 Wall. 342; Embrey v. Jemison,
(1889) 131 U. S. 336, 9 S. Ct. 776; McMullen v. Hoffman, (1899) 174 U. S.
639, 19 S. Ct. 839; see Hanauer v. Woodruff, (U.S. 1872) 15 Wall. 439, 443.
176See 184 U. S. at 549.
177See
Williston, Contracts § 1753.
"78 The patent cases, considered pp. 552-63 mfra, likewise permit defendant
to prove the violation as a defense though it does not appear in plaintiff's
case. 9
"7 See (1937) 50 Stat. at L. 693, (1940)

15 U. S. C. 1.
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to form, and offer an easy method to avoid this defense by careful
draftsmanship and oral understandings.' 80
The Supreme Court's latest word on this defense appears in a
five to four decision in an action begun in a Florida state court
for the price of cans sold by American Can Company to Bruce's
Juices, Inc.' There the majority refused to recognize as a defense plaintiff's alleged violation of the Robinson-Patman Act t82 by
discriminatory prices favoring defendant's competitors. Testimony
at a pre-trial hearing revealed that during a five year period defendant had paid plaintiff some $2,000,000 for cans and that the
$114,000 renewal notes on which the action was based represented
the unpaid balance and were not identified with any particular
transactions. The alleged discrimination resulted from quantity
discounts available on equal terms to all buying the required
quantities." 3 The trial court found that the defense was not available as a matter of law and entered judgment for the plaintiffs
without any trial on the merits of the defense. This was affirmed
8 4
by the Florida Supreme Court.
In the United States Supreme Court two alternative grounds
were urged on appeal (1) Such illegality is a complete defense
to any action for the sales price. (2) Such illegality is a defense
to so much of the notes as represents the illegal price differential,
and determination of the amount due on this theory should be left
to a trial on the merits. The majority opinion took the position
that the second alternative could not be established on the facts
since the notes were not identified with any particular transaction,'18 and much of its opinion on the legal issue seemed directed
only to whether illegal discrimination, if established, would constitute a complete defense to an action for the purchase price. Its
answer was "No." The minority opinion took the position that
the defendant should have been given the opportunity to prove its
second alternative, 6 and considered only whether illegal discrimination should bar an action to recover that portion of the
18 OBut cf. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., (1947) 67 S. Ct. 1015,

1021, considered infra note 211 on this point.
1SlIbid. The four dissenting justices in the Katzanger and Westinghouse
cases were joined by Chief Justice Vinson to make up a majority.
182(1936) 49 Stat. at L. 1526, (1940) 15 U. S.C. § 13.
'S3Quantity discounts available to all on equal terms do not necessarily
reflect only the "due allowance" authorized by the act for differences in
cost resulting from different quantities. See ibid.
184Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., (1945) 155 Fla. 877, 22 S. (2d)
461. 85
' See 67 S.Ct. at 1017-18.
1soSee 67 S. Ct. at 1022-25.
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purchase price representing the discrimination. Its answer was
"Yes." Thus the two opinions do not quite come to grips with the
same legal issue, and the considerations urged in one opinion are
in some instances not relevant to the issue considered in the other.
This much is clear. The majority decided, without equivocation, that discriminatory pricing in violation of the Robinson
Patman Act is not a-complete defense to an action for the purchase
price. On this point no dissent is expressed, hence, this may be
considered fairly well settled despite the five to four decision.
The remaining problem is whether, in a case squarely presenting
the issue, a purchaser may avoid liability for so much of the purchase price as represents the illegal differential. The rationale of
majority opinion points toward a negative answer.
The majority bases its decision primarily upon its conclusion
that in the Robmson-Patman Act Congress provided remedies
which were adequate and exclusive, but the exclusive remedy
dogma was not invoked as a rule of law. 8 7 Instead, the opinion considered the precise statute before the Court and advanced several
related reasons for its conclusion that no judicial remedy should
be added to those provided by Conkress.
Pbinting out that the "only sanctions provided by Congress"
were treble damages to redress private injury and criminal proceedings to vindicate the public interest, 88 the Court urged that uncollectibility of the purchase price was apparently never considered by
Congress despite its obvious effectiveness as a sanction. Instead
Congress "declined to adopt" a much less drastic sanction to
"compel the remission of the excess charged,"' 89 and "at no time
does it appear that either house
wanted to go so far as to
permit a buyer to get goods for nothing."' 90 While this reasoning is
directed to the more drastic remedy of a complete defense, it appears to apply as well to the more moderate defense against collection of the excess only. If Congress would not compel remission of the excess it would not have been likely in an anti-disl.87 The exclusive remedy language in the Wilder case was quoted in
connection with the Court's explanation of the Sherman Act cases, but was
not invoked nor relied upon as the basis for denying the defense. See 67
S. Ct. at 1021.
ssSee 67 S. Ct. at 1018. At this point the Court overlooked the Act's
most effective remedies, the Federal Trade Commission's cease and desist
order expressly authorized by Section 2 (b) of the Act (15 U. S. C. 13(b),
and the government suit in equity to enjoin further violations. Elsewhere the
opinion indicates the Court's familiarity with the Federal .Trade Commission's89jurisdiction. See 67 S. Ct. at 1016.
' The history is fully documented m the opinion. See 67 S. Ct. at 1019.
'9OSee ibid.
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crimination statute to approve a defense against collection of the
excess, for that would place those who pay their invoices promptly
at a price disadvantage over those who do not.""
The opinion then answers counsels' contention that such a
defense is needed because the treble damage remedy is often inadequate due to the protracted and expensive nature of anti-trust
litigation and the speculative character of the damages. 192 The Court
was not diverted to a consideration of the inadequacy of treble
damages as demonstrating the need for the defense in the case of
anti-trust violations generally 113 It directed its answer to demonstrate that as applied to price discrimination under the RobinsonPatman Act the treble damage remedy is entirely adequate. It
reasoned that if Bruce can prove the illegal discrimination in this
suit, "it can do the same in a triple damage suit." The damages are
no more speculative or unprovable in one suit than the other,194
and proof of the illegal prices without more "would establish its
"19r
rights to recover three times the discriminatory difference
Hence "no reason suggests itself why Congress should have intended" a defensive remedy amounting to only one-third the
amount recoverable "on the same proof" in a treble damage action.
Since the alternative defense against payment of the discriminatory
excess only "is but a weak one-third shadow of the one Congress
expressly gave, we cannot see the need for judicial reduplication
in miniature." 196
While this analysis of the statutory remedies was first directed
against permitting "a buyer to get goods for nothing," 197 it closes
with the above reference to the alternative attempt to avoid liability
for the discriminatory differential only The entire analysis on
this point seems to apply with equal force to this alternative defense and to indicate the probable view of the majority on this
issue.
In addition to its reliance on the statutory remedies, the
majority advanced the related consideration that "annexation" of
the defense to the statute, either as an "inference of unexpressed
IilCf. 67 S. Ct. at 1020, considered infra p. 545.
192See 67 S. Ct. at 1019; Brief for the Petitioner, p. 26-29; authorities
cited infra notes 318, 320. Counsel for Bruce also urged that all three government remedies depended on the government's mitiative, and at best could only
prevent or deter future violations, not require reimbursement for excesses

already charged.
i9sSee infra pp. 570-71.
194See 67 S. Ct. at 1019.
195
See id. at 1021.
196See
id. at 1022.
9
1 7See id. at 1019.
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intention of Congress" or by some common law doctrine,"' would
bring undesirable results at war with the purposes of the statute.
Two such results were emphasized. The first was that such a
defense would tend to result in withholding credit from the small
buyer when quantity discounts are granted to the large buyer
under circumstances raising doubts as to the operation of "this
rather difficult statute." In that manner a seller might readily
avoid the risk of loss from a defense measured, not by the extent
of the harm, but by the amount of credit advanced.' Such reasoning was directed against recognition of illegal discrimination as a
complete defense to the amount due, and applies with less force to
the alternative defense permitting the buyer to escape payment of
the discriminatory excess only Still, some incentive to withhold
credit to avoid this lesser defense could arise, though the smaller
risk of loss would minimize the probability of such drastic action
by a seller interested in the good will of all customers.200
The second undesirable result urged was the danger that recognition of the defense would defeat the policy of the Act by bringing
about price discrimination in favor of those who buy for credit
and then assert the defense. Those who buy for cash pay the full
price and cannot take advantage of the defense.20 This consideration would apply equally both to the broad and to the narrow
defense, since even under the narrow defense Bruce could take
advantage of the lower price which would not be available to his
competitors who paid the full price without litigation. The weight
of this consideration might well be questioned, for substantially
the same objection could be urged to the treble damage remedy
expressly provided by Congress. The buyer who brings such an
action will recover three times the illegal discrimination and have
an even greater advantage over his competitor who chooses to pay
the price demanded without litigation.20 2
198See ibid.
at 1020. The Court stressed the irrationality of a defense where
S99See id.
the "reparation" would not be "measured at least roughly by the extent of the
as are treble damages. See consideration of this factor infra p. 573.
injury,"
2
0OIn fact, it might be questioned whether there is any substantial likelihood that credit would be withheld even though the broader defense were
recognized, in view of the importance of good will to the seller and the
relatively few buyers who would risk their credit standing and possible
trade20reprisals to take advantage of such a defense.
See 67 S. Ct. at 1020. The court pointed out that if the broader defense succeeded Bruce would obtain a discount amounting to approximately
5% on all purchases made.
2O-Apparently with his tongue m his cheek, Mr. Justice Jackson suggests that these two undesirable results could only be avoided by reopening
all past transactions tainted by the discount system to permit recovery of
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The dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Murphy does not controvert this analysis except the basic conclusion that the statutory sanctions are exclusive. It urges repeatedly that the courts and the judicial process should not be used "to effectuate what Congress clearly
made illegal" by aiding in the collection of the discriminatory differential,20 3 and would make a finding that "the language and policy of
the Act frown upon" such use of the courts. 2

1

4

As applied to anti-

trust violations without adequate statutory remedies for the injured
party, 20 5 such considerations would seem entitled to great weight.
But as applied to actions to collect a discriminatory price in the federal courts a complete rebuttal could be made by replying that treble
damages are now recoverable in a counterclaim 20 6 on substantially
the same pleading and proof as would have been required to establish
the defense.20 7 Hence the federal courts would not aid in collecting
the illegal price, but instead would credit the buyer with three times
the illegal excess. Such a rebuttal provides little comfort for the
buyer sued in the state court, who must bring a separate action
in the federal court to secure this relief. But in the end the total
judicial machinery of the nation would effectuate the purpose of
the Act, and there may be good reason for withholding the coiplex problems of quantity discounts in national commerce from
state courts whose decisions could be reviewed and kept in line
20 8
with federal policy only by the Supreme Court itself.

the "whole purchase price." He adds that this would "soon end illegal quantity

discounts-by ending the business," and that Congress could hardly have
contemplated or left the way open for "so deadly a remedy." See 67 S. Ct.
at 1020. No such drastic remedy had been suggested, but if it were within
the court's power to recognize such a remedy, it would be equally within its
power to limit such recovery to the amount of the discrimination only. Such
affirmative remedies would seem clearly subject to the exclusive remedy
rule, particularly in this instance where Congress had rejected the less

drastic
remedy which would have permitted- recovery of the excess.
20
3See 67 S. Ct. at 1023, 1024-25.
20
See 67 S.Ct. at 1023.
" 020 5See mfra pp. 570-71.

' Rule 13(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, following 28 U S. C. A.
723 c, Hartford Empire Co. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., (W.D. Pa. 1942) '17
F

Supp. 711,

Brown Paper Mill Co. v. Agar Mfg. Corp., (S.D. N.Y

1941) 1 F R. D. 579. Contra Barnsdall Ref. Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co..
(E.D. Wis. 1940) 32 F Supp. 314. The latter case ignores the plain language
of Rule 13(b) to follow the Connolly decision denying a set-off under very

different
20 7 procedural rules. See 184 U. S. at 552.
See supra p. 544.

20osSo long as the Act is not within the jurisdiction of state courts, the
principal burden of maintaining consistent policy will continue to be borne by

the Circuit Courts of Appeals, guided to a considerable extent by Federal
Trade Commission policy, with only an occasional appeal to the Supreme
Court. The Court recognizes the desirability of having the Federal Trade
Commission decide quantity discount problems in the first instance (67
S. Ct. at 1016) and may well have shuddered at the thought of reviewing state
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As a direct answer to the majority view that the statutory
remedies are exclusive, the dissenting opinion also urged that "a
specific statutory provision is unnecessary to make an illegal contract
unenforceable in the courts."20 9 The majority recognized that the
Court would not enforce a contract "intrinsically illegal" under
the Sherman Act "to which both defendant and plaintiff are parties
and which has as its object and effect accomplishment of illegal
ends which would be consummated by the judgment .
"1:10 It
reasoned, however, that this "case law as to the Sherman Act does
not fit the Robinson-Patman Act," stressing three related characteristics :
(1) No single sale can violate the Robinson-Patman Act.
(2) Hence, illegality would pose problems as to whether and
when a sale would be made invalid by prior, simultaneous,
or subsequent discriminatory sales.
(3) The violation "is not inherent in the contract sued upon
.. but can only be found in different transactions" to which
only the seller is a party.211
This reasoning of the majority seems directed against the
broader defense denying all recovery, though formally the same
points could have been urged against the lesser defense. As to
neither does the reasoning carry conviction. Admittedly the simple
concept of illegal contracts requires some refinement when applied
to illegal discrimination, but feasible theories could readily have
been advanced had the Court desired to recognize the defense. For
example, the minority reasoned that the illegality affects, not the
sale in its entirety, but only the "discriminatory differential" which
"falls squarely within the area of illegality defined by the statcourt decisions on that issue. Such considerations will likely influence

Congress not to take advantage under the anti-trust laws of its recently
recognized power to require state courts to enforce federal statutes by treble
damage actions. Cf. Testa v. Katt, (1947) 67 S. Ct. 810.
-09See 67 S. Ct. at 1023.
-lOSee id. at 1020.

2-See id. at 1021. In developing this view that discrimination involves
transactions with others, the opinion makes the point that while no court
would aid the plaintiff if he must show the illegality to recover, lie can
establish his case here without showing illegality. See ibid. The possible
implication that the illegality must appear as a. part of the plaintiff's
case is palpably unsound as pointed out in the dissenting opinion, See 67
S. Ct. at 1025. Such a limitation on the defense of illegality would be inconsistent with a number of Supreme Court decisions. See pp. 540-42 supra. It
would be inconsistent in result not only with the Sola, Katzinger and
Westinghouse cases, but also with the recent patent infringement cases
considered infra pp. 552-59. That such an implication was not intended by tie
majority seems indicated by its recognition of McMullen v. Hoffman, (1899)
174 U. S. 639, 19 S. Ct. 839, one of the leading authorities on this point.
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ute. ' 2 1 ? On this theory, only that part of the purchase price which
discriminates against the buyer would be "illegal" and not recoverable.
The failure of the majority to advert to this theory of the
minority, and to come to grips with the theoretical problems involved in applying the illegality concept, suggests that it was not
particularly concerned over those problems. It appears to have
devoted just enough attention to the concept of illegal contracts
to distinguish the prior Sherman Act decisions without raising
doubts as to their continued authority Its primary interest, and
the whole emphasis of its opinion, is to be found, not in any
doctrinaire or theoretical approach, but in practical considerations
relating to indications of Congressional intent, adequacy of statutory remedies, and undesirable consequences which might result
from recognition of the defense.
This essentially practical approach is the primary significance
of the Bruce's Juices case, apart from the holding itself. For the
first time, the Court has carefully analyzed a statute to determine
whether the statutory sanctions are really adequate, and whether
recognition of the defense would advance or hinder the ains and
purposes of Congress. Prior decisions dealing with this defense
in contract cases had proceeded, in the main, on doctrinaire grounds
either the illegality was collateral and the defense not available,
or was inherent in the contract and the defense was available.
Occasional flashes suggest that this doctrinaire approach may have
concealed more practical thinking, 213 and the Katzoiger opinion
early in 1947 seemed based primarily on the value of the defense
as a sanction to discourage misuse of patents to maintain prices
illegally, rather than on any conceptual approach to illegality 214
This last decision, concurred in by the four justices who dissented
in the Katzinger case, gives some reason to hope that hereafter
violation of the anti-trust laws as a defense will be approached from
the standpoint of practical realities.21 5
2 12

See id. at 1024.

e.g. the reasoning in the Wall Paper case, noted supra p. 523, and
Mr. Justice Holmes dissent in the same case, noted supra p. 520. Chief
2-3See

Justice'White's involved and obscure reasoning in the Wilder case possibly
deserves mention inthis connection. See supra pp. 526-28.
'14See supra pp. 537-38.
2 5
1 0n the other hand, the decision is readily subject to misuse as an
authority for the dogma that the statutory remedies of the anti-trust laws
are exclusive. Such a use would not fairly reflect the holding, since the
reasons for holding the remedies exclusive in this case were directed only
to the particular statute, its legislative history, and the adequacy of its
remedies to correct violations of its prohibitions on discrimination. To con-
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What light does this decision shed on the factors suggested
earlier as possible reasons for limiting the defense in anti-trust
cases?216

(1) While the majority referred several times to permitting
"the buyer to get his goods for nothing,"217 there is no indication that the Court felt, as did Mr. Justice Holmes, that the
policy against permitting a windfall should outweigh the policy
of the anti-trust laws. 218 On the contrary, the Court's first concern appeared to be enforcement of the policy of the RobinsonPatman Act. It concluded that the policy of the Act would not
only be enforced just as well with the statutory sanctions only,
but that recognition of the defense as an added sanction would
threaten certain results detrimental to the purposes of the act.
(2) The exclusiveness of the statutory remedies was recognized in the opinion but not as a doctrinaire rule to be applied
without regard to the adequacy of those remedies.2 19
(3) For the first time the Court openly examined the legislative history for light as to what Congress would likely have
done with this defense, and gave some weight to that history.-20
If this approach is followed, the legislative history detailed
in the earlier portion of this article may in the future be given
increased attention in the application of this defense.221
(4) No weight is given expressly to the possible undesirability of a mass of collateral evidence relating to anti-trust
violations, and to the difficulties of determining anti-trust issues,
in a simple suit on a contract. However, there were indications
that the Court was cognizant of these practical considerations
and may have been influenced by them. In its preliminary analysis of the case the majority pointed out that the economic effects of quantity discounts "are for the Federal Trade Commission to judge," and that until it has acted the "courts are
not given guidance as to what the public interest does require
lude that the Bruce's Juices case is authority for applying the exclusive
remedy dogma to all possible violations of the anti-trust laws ignores the

very2meat
of the majority opinion.
' 6See supra pp. 519-20, 528-29.
21
7See 67 S. Ct. 1018, 1019.
-229sSee supra p. 520.

' See supra pp. 543-45.
supra pp. 543-44.
1See supra pp. 508-12. Compare the weight given a similar history showing Congressional failure to adopt long-pending measures to forfeit patents
22
22oSee

for anti-trust violation. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, (1945)
323 U. S. 386, 416 65 S. Ct. 373. But compare concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Rutledge in Cleveland v. United States, (1947) 67 S. Ct. 13, 17-18.
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",222 While the Court added that it was unnecessary to "consider these features of the Act ' 223 since, granting the violation,
no defense was asserted, the difficulty of this issue may well
have had some influence on the conclusion that such problems
should not be determined in a simple suit to recover the purchase price of goods. Further, the Court's emphasis upon tile
necessity of going into transactions entirely separate from and
unrelated to the sale in order to find a violation of the RobmisonPatman Act 22 4 may likewise reflect a belief that it is not wise
to permit such collateral matters to complicate a simple contract action.
These factors will receive further consideration in the concluding
summary
The defense as applied to torts.
The only tort cases in which the defense has raised significant
problems have been those for infringement of patents, trademarks
or copyrights. 225 Ever since adoption of the Sherman Act defendants in such infringement suits persistently raised the defense
that plaintiff was using the patent, trademark or copyright for
monopolistic purposes in violation of the act. Just as consistently
the lower federal courts rejected the defense 22 1 except in a few
222
See 67 S.Ct. at 1016.

2 23

id. at 1017
67 S.Ct. at 1021, considered supra p. 547, note 211.
Violation of the anti-trust laws has been recognized as a defense
to actions for inducing breach of contract. See supra p. 524. Two circuit courts
of appeal have applied the defense in treble damage actions where the plaintiff
participated with defendant in the violation on which the action was based.
Bluefields S. S. Co. v United Fruit Co., (C.C.A. 3d 1917) 243 Fed. 1,
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, (C.C.A. 2d 1921) 277 Fed. 694. The
Supreme Court has assumed the defense would be available to defeat a
treble damage action in a proper case, but has held that plaintiff's compliance with defendant's illegal restrictions in order to obtain goods required
to carry on his business does not bar him from recovery for subsequent
violations by defendant in which plaintiff did not participate. Eastman Kodak
Co. v Southern Photo Materials Co., (1927) 273 U. S.359, 47 S.Ct. 400,
cf. Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, (C.C.A. 3d 1921) 271 Fed. 810.
2 26
In the early patent cases restraint of trade and monopolistic practices
were urged in vain without reference to the Sherman Act. Strait v. National
Harrow Co., (C.C. N.Y. 1892) 51 Fed. 819, 820 (dictum) , Edison Elec.
Light Co. v. Sawyer-Man Elec. Co., (C.C.A. 2d 1892) 53 Fed. 592, cert.
denied 149 U. S. 785, 13 S. Ct. 1052, American Soda-Fountain Co. v.
Green, (C.C. Pa. 1895) 69 Fed. 333, Bonsack Mach. Co. v Smith, (C.C.
N.C. 1895) 70 Fed. 383. Contra, National Harrow Co v. Quick, (C.C. Id.
1895) 67 Fed. 130 (alternative ground), affirmed on other ground, (C.C.A. 7th
1896) 74 Fed. 236, cf. National Harrow Co. v. Hench, (C.C. N.Y. 1898)
84 Fed. 226.
The result was no different when the Sherman Act was expressly relied
upon. Patent cases Brown Saddle Co. v. Troxel, (C.C. Ohio, 1899) 98
See
2
4See
225
3
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cases of a special type 227 decided just prior to approval of the
defense by the Supreme Court in 1942.228
The basic reasoning of these lower court decisions was simply that
plaintiff owned the patent or copyright like any other property and
the mere fact that he had violated the anti-trust laws would not j usti fy
Fed. 620; National Folding-Box & Paper Co. v. Robertson, (C.C. Conn.
1900) 99 Fed. 985, Otis Elevator Co. v. Geiger, (C.C. Ky. 1901) 107 Fed.
131, General Elec. Co. v. Wise, (C.C. N.Y. 1903) 119 Fed. 922, JohnsPratt Co. v. Sachs Co., (D. Conn. 1910) 176 Fed. 738, Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Laemnle, (S.D. N.Y. 1910) 178 Fed. 104, Motion Pictures
Patents Co. v. Ullman, (S.D. N.Y. 1910) 186 Fed. 174; U. S. Fire Escape
Counterbalance Co. v. Halsted Co., (N.D. Ill. 1912) 195 Fed. 295, Fraser
v. Duffey, (D. Mass. 1912) 196 Fed. 900; Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Eclair Film Co., (D. N.J. 1913) 208 Fed. 416, General Elec. Co. v. Minneapolis Elec. Lamp Co., (D. Minn. 1924) 10 F (2d) 851, Radio Corp. of
Am. v. Majestic Distributors, (D. Conn. 1931) 53 F (2d) 641, National
Elec. Products Corp. v. Circle Flexible Conduit Co., (E.D. N.Y. 1931)
57 F. (2d) 219; Radio Corp. v. Hygrade Sylvania Corp., (D. N.J. 1934)
10 F Supp. 879; cf. Western Elec. Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., (S.D.
N.Y: 1930) 53 F. (2d) 639 (joinder mninfringement suit of patentee and
exclusive licensee under license violating anti-trust laws held not improper).
Trade mark cases: General Elec. Co. v. Re-New Lamp Co., (D.C.
Mass. 1904) 128 Fed. 154, Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman,
(C.C. NJ. 1904) 130 Fed. 726; Northwestern Consol. Milling Co. v.
Callam & Son, (E.D. Mich. 1910) 177 Fed. 786, Coca-Cola v. Deacon
Brown Bottling Co., (N.D. Ala. 1912) 200 Fed. 105, Searchlight Gas
Co. v. Prest-O-Lite Co., (C.C.A. 7th 1914) 215 Fed. 692; Coca-Cola Co.
v. Bennett, (C.A.A. 8th 1916) 238 Fed. 513, Thum & Co. v. Dickinson,
(C.C.A. 6th 1917) 245 Fed. 609, cert. denied 246 U. S. 664, 38 S. Ct. 334,
cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1912) 200 Fed. 720, cert.
denied 229 U. S. 613, 33 S. Ct. 773 (unfair competition).
Copyright cases: Harms v. Cohen, (E.D. Pa. 1922) 279 Fed. 276,
Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., (E.D. S.C. 1924) 298 Fed.
470, affirmed (C.C.A. 4th 1924) 2 F (2d) 1020; Vitagraph v. Grobaski,
(W.D. Mich. 1931) 46 F. (2d) 813, Tiffany Productions v. Dewing, (D.
Md. 1931) 50 F (2d) 911, Buck v. Hillsgrove Country Club, (D. R.I.
1937) 17 F Supp. 643, Buck v. Del Papa, (D. R.I. 1937) 17 F Supp. 645,
Buck v. Newsreel Inc., .(D. Mass. 1938) 25 F Supp. 787, Buck v. Cecere,
(W.D. N.Y. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 441.
227
None of these cases purported to recognize violation of the anti-trust
laws as a defense. They applied the rule of Carbice Corp. v. American
Patents Corp., (1931) 283 U. S. 27, 51 S. Ct. 334, considered infra pp.
to deny relief for direct and contributory infringement when the patent
was being used to secure a limited monopoly on unpatent products. Ferguson Mfg. Works v. Am. Lecithin Co., (C.C.A. 1st 1938) 94 F (2d)
729, cert. denied 304 U. S. 573, 58 S. Ct. 1042 (contributory), Philad Co. v.
Lechler Corp., (C.C.A. 2d 1939) 107 F (2d) 747 (same), Am. Lecithin Co.
v. Warfield Co., (C.C.A. 7th 1939) 105 F (2d) 207, cert. denied, 308 U. S.
609, 60 S. Ct. 171 (direct) , Barber Asphalt Corp. v. La Fera Grecco Contracting Co., (C.C.A. 3d 1940) 116 F (2d) 211 (direct), Dehydrators, Ltd. v.
Petrolite Corp., Ltd., (C.C.A. 9th 1941) 117 F (2d) 183 (direct and
contributory), Novadel-Agene Corp. v. Penn, (C.C.A. 5th 1941) 119 F
(2d) 764, cert. denied 314 U. S. 645, 62 S. Ct. 85 (same), American Lecithin
Co. v. Warfield Co., (N.D. Ill. 1941) 42 F Supp. 270 (direct), cf. Cream
Top Bottle Co. v. Bailes, (C.C.A. 10th 1933) 62 F (2d) 714 (attempted
use of patent on milk bottle to monopolize milk business).
228See mfra pp. 554-56.
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an interloper in helping himself to the property.229 This reason seems
valid in those cases in which the patent, trademark or copyright
was not being used by the anti-trust violator as an instrumentality
by which to accomplish his illegal purpose. In such cases protection of the patent will not aid the illegal purpose and the mere fact
that a patent holder violates the anti-trust laws does not make
him an outlaw
When the patent is being used as the key by which the Sherman
Act is violated a very different problem is presented. For example,
in a number of patent infringement cases the defense was that
competitors had assigned their patents to the plaintiff and taken
licenses in return as one step in a conspiracy to enhance prices
and control production in violation of the Sherman Act. In such
cases the infringement suit was one of the primary means by
which the combination, through use of the patents, maintained the
monopolistic position which made its price and production control
effective. Nevertheless the defense was rejected.2"' Equally unsuccessful was the defense that plaintiff was a party to a conspiracy of
copyright holders to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman
Act and was using this particular infringement suit to make that
conspiracy effective. 23 1 A similar result was reached where defen-

dant claimed the plaintiff was using a trademark to make effective
232
an unlawful monopoly in the sale of Coca Cola.
PATENTS.

In the Morton Salt case- 3 3 in 1942 the Supreme Court dis-

credited this entire line of lower court decisions without referring
to them. While the Court appeared only to be taking the next
logical step in the line of cases applying the Carbtce doctrine, it
29
See e.g. Strait v. National Harrow Co., (C.C. N.Y 1892) 51 Fed,
819, 820 (denying injunction to restrain infringement suit) , Brown Saddle
Co. v. Troxel, (C.C. Ohio 1899) 98 Fed. 620, 621, U. S. Fire Escape
Counterbalance Co., v. Halsted Co., (N.D. Ill. 1912) 195 Fed. 294, 297,
Harms v. Cohen, (E.D. Pa. 1922) 279 Fed. 276, 280, Witmark & Sons v,
Pastime
230 Amusement Co., (E.D. S.C. 1924) 298 Fed. 470, 480.
National Folding-Box and Paper Co. v. Robertson, Otis Elevator
Co. v Geiger; U. S. Fire Escape Counterbalance Co. v. Halsted Co., JohnsPratt Co. v. Sachs, National Elec. Products Corp. v. Circle Flexible Conduit
Co., cf. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Ullman (using patent to further illegal
monopoly) , Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Eclair Film Co. (same), all
cited23supra
note 226.
t
Harms v. Cohen, (E.D. Pa. 1922), 279 Fed. 276. Compare other
copyright cases cited supra note 226, raising similar issues.
232Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, (C.C.A. 8th 1916) 238 Fed. 513, cf.
Independent Baking Powder Co. v Boorman, (C.C. N.J. 1904) 130 Fed.
726. 23
3Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., (1942) 314 U. S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402.
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rested the decision upon a ground which would dearly recognize,
at least in equity, the defense that the patent was being used to
violate the anti-trust laws.
The progenitor of the Carbice doctrine was the Motion Picture
Patentscase2 34 which held in 1917 that the holder of a patent on a
motion picture projector could not prevent the buyer of the projector from using films produced by other companies. The Court
ruled that the patent monopoly did not include unpatented products
used with patented products. Hence, the use of films not furnished
by the patent holder was not an infringement and the furnishing
of the films by another was not contributory infringement.
The Carbicecase -35 went one step further in 1931. There, plaintiff held a patent on an ice cream transportation package using
solid carbon dioxide (dry ice) as the refrigerating agent, and
licensed use of the package only by those purchasing dry ice from
plaintiff. It did not sell or deal in the packages, only in the dry ice.
Charging contributory infringement, it sought to enjoin defendant
from selling dry ice for use in such packages. Unlike the Motion
PicturePatents case, denial of relief was not based on the absence
of infringement.by the users of the package. This was not in issue.
Relief was demed, rather,
"* * * because the Dry Ice Corporation is attempting, without
sanction of law, to employ the patent to secure a limited monopoly
of unpatented material used in applying the invention. The present
attempt is analogous to the use oT a patent as an instrumentality
for restraining commerce which was condemned, under the Slierman Anti-Trust Law, in Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United
' 6
States, 226 U. S. 20."2
At this point Mr. Justice Brandeis added in a footnote
"In such cases, the attempt to use the patent unreasonably to
of the grant, but
restrain commerce is not only beyond the scope
23 also a direct violation of the Anti-Trust Acts. " 7
While the decision denies judicial aid on the ground that the Court
will not sanction an attempt to secure a limited monopoly beyond
the scope of the patent,238 the reference to the anti-trust laws at
2 4Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., (1917)
243 U. S. 502, 37 S. Ct. 416, overruling Henry v. Dick & Co., (1912) 224
U. S.2 1, 32 S. Ct 364.
35Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp., (1931) 283 U. S. 27,
51 S.23 6Ct 334.
See 283 U. S. at 33-34.
- 7 See 283 U. S. at 34, n. 4.
2
sSee 283 U. S. at 35. The case is subsequently explained on thls basis
and followed in Leitch Mlfg. Co. v. Barber Co., (1938) 302 U. S. 458, 463,
58 S. Ct. 288, which involved basically the same issues as the Carbice case.
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least suggests the possibility of the same result where the patent
is being used, as in the Standard Sanitary Mfg. case, 239 as the
major instrumentality of a price fixing combination.
The Mort0rn Salt case in 1942240 involved a similar attempt,
this time to secure a limited monopoly on unpatented salt tablets
for canned foods by leasing a patented salt tablet depositor to
canners on condition that only plaintiff's salt tablets would be used
with the depositor. Apparently seeking to avoid the Carbice rule,
no claim of contributory infringement was made. Plaintiff based its
action for an injunction and accounting solely on direct infringement of the patent 241 by Morton Salt Company's manufacture and
sale to canners of a salt depositing machine claimed to infringe the
patent.242 Finding that plaintiff was using its patent "to restrain
salt tablets for
competition in the marketing of unpatented .
use with the patented machines,'

24 3

the Supreme Court denied

relief on grounds analogous to the clean hands doctrine, eniphasizing public rather than private interests. It reached the same conclusion in the Chemical Co. case decided the same day 244
While the lower courts had been concerned with whether or not
plaintiff's practices violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act,'24 the
Court did not find it necessary to answer this question. Instead, it
invoked the
"
principle of general application that courts, and especially
courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid when the
plaintiff
is using the right asserted contrary to the public inter24 6
est.,"

9

23 Standard Sanitary

Mfg. Co. v. United States, (1912)

226 U. S.

20, 33 S.Ct. 9. (License to manufacturers required adherence to prices determined by committee of competing manufacturers, and "license" to jobbers
required
resale at stipulated prices. Held, violation of Sherman Act.)
240Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co.. (1942) 314 U. S. 488, 62 S. Ct.
402, Note (1942) 51 Yale L. Jr. 1012, (1942) 42 Col. L. Rev. 882.
24Several lower federal courts had already applied the Carbice doctrine
to similar cases of direct infringement where the patent was being used to
obtain a limited monopoly on an unpatented product. See cases cited supra
note 227
42
2 Morton Salt Company was also engaged in selling salt tablets to the
canners using its salt depositing machine, but the Supreme Court considered this immaterial, and assumed "for the purposes of this case that
petitioner is doing no more than making and leasing the alleged infringiig
machines." See 314 U. S. at 491, 493.
243See 314 U. S. at 491.

244Chemical
Co. v. Ellis, (1942) 314 U. S. 495, 62 S.Ct. 406.
45
2 See 314 U S. at 490. Cf. Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Auilt & Wiierg
Corp., (C.C.A. 6th 1936) 83 F (2d) 764.
24GSee 314 U. S. at 492. In support, the Court cited the following, all
equity cases Virginia Ry. v. Federation, (1937) 300 U. S. 515, 552, 57
S. Ct. 592 (Equity may require employer to perform its statutory duty to
negotiate with labor union in view of strong public interest "Courts of
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The Court found inapplicable the usual rile limiting the clean
hands doctrine to wrongful conduct connected with the subject
matter of the litigation m a manner affecting the equities between
the parties,247 because "maintenance of the suit concerns the public interest."2 48 Having thus rejected the basis on which some earlier
lower court decisions had held the clean hands doctrine no defense
where anti-trust violations were concerned, 49 the Court went on
to point out that successful prosecution of an infringement suit,
even against one not competing in the sale of the unpatent product,
would be "a powerful aid to the maintenance of the attempted
monopoly of the unpatented product" because it would persuade
"the public of the validity of the patent." 2 50 Hence, maintenance
public policy and it was properly
of the suit would be contrary -to
51
dismissed for want of equity.
The Court indicated that basis for its decision was broader
merely preventing misuse of a patent to obtain a limited
monopoly on unpatented products. Its reasonsavere "fundamentally

-than

equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold
relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go
when only private interests are involved."), Central Kentucky Natural
Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, (1933) 290 U. S. 264, 270-73, 54 S. Ct. 154
(Dicta. as condition of equitable relief from illegal tax or rate, court of
equity may reqture plaintiff to comply with tax or rate conceded to be legal),
Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., (1933) 289 U. S. 334, 337-8, 53

S. Ct 602 (Injunction against operation of nuisance [sewage disposal plant]

may be demed "where an important public interest would be prejudiced."),
Beasley v. Texas & Pacific Ry., (1903) 191 U. S. 492, 497, 24 S. Ct. 164
(Whether legal or illegal, covenant not to build depot on land deeded to
railroad will not be enforced in equity where paramount public interests
control), Securities and Exchange Commission v. U. S. Realty Co., (1940)
310 U. S. 434, 455, 60 S. Ct. 1044 (Bankruptcy court, as court of equity, could
deny bankrupt's resort to one alternative method, literally authorized, where
the other method would better safeguard public interests. "A court of
.").
equity. . may m the public interest, even withhold relief altogether
The Court also cited a similar dictum in United States v. Morgan, (1939)
S. 183, 194, 59 S. Ct 795.
307 U.
2
47See Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., (1933) 290
U. S. 240, 244-46, 54 S. Ct 146; 2 Pomeroy, Equity jurisprudence (5th ed.

1941)24 § 399.

See 314 U. S. at 493.
See General Elec. Co. v. Minneapolis Elec. Lamp Co., (D. Minn.
1924) 10 F (2d) 851, 854-855, Radio Corp. of Am. v. Majestic Distributors,
(D. Conn. 1931) 53 F (2d) 641, 643, Radio Corp. v. Hygrade Sylvania
Corp., (D. NJ. 1934) 10 F. Supp. 879, 882; Buck v. Hillsgrove Country
Club, (D. RI. 1937) 17 F. Supp, 643, 645, cf. Bonsack Macb. Co. v.
Smith, (C.C. N.C. 1895) 70 Fed 383, 386 (same except anti-trust violation
not alleged). But cf. National Harrow Co. v. Quick, (C.C. Ind. 1895) 67
Fed. 130, 132; Novadel-Agene Corp. v. Penn, (C.C.., 5th 1941) 119 F
(2d) 2 764, 766, cert. denied 314 U. S. 645, 62 S. Ct. 85.
5OSee 314 U. S. at 493
249

25

'See 314 U. S. at 494.
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the same" as those for barring an infringement suit against a
vendee of a patented or copyrighted article for violation of a
condition for maintenance of resale prices.25 2 It was "the adverse
effect upon the public interest of a successful infringement suit, in
conjunction with the patentee's course of conduct" which barred
him, even though the particular defendant may not have "suffered from the misuse of the patent.

' 25

1

What other types of misuse, short of anti-trust violations,
might justify that result is beyond the scope of this article.25 4 Certainly, however, the controlling considerations in the Morton Salt
case would lead to barring an infringement suit when the patent
is being used as the instrumentality or key for making effective a
price maintenance scheme or other anti-trust violation. 25 Indeed,
use of the patent to violate the anti-trust laws would seem to
establish an even stronger case, for the successful infringement
suit would not only promote the effectiveness of the scheme by
persuading the "public of the validity of the patent," but would
actually eliminate the very competition threatening the effectiveness
of the price maintenance scheme, or, as an alternative, would force
the infringer into the combination. The Court's familiarity with
such use of infringement suits to force competitors into combma2
25 See

314 U S. at 493-94. The Court cited the following Adams v.
Burke, (U.S. 1874) 17 Wall. 453 (no infringement for purchaser of patented
product to use it outside of area authorized by patentee), Bater & Cie v.
O'Donnell, (1913) -) U. S. 1, 33 S. Ct. 616 (no infringement for purchaser
of patented producL to sell for less than stipulated minimum price) , BobbsMerrill Co. v. Strais, (1908) 210 U. S.339, 28 S. Ct. 722 (same for copyright) , Straus v. Jictor Talking Machine Co., (1917) 243 U. S.490, 37
S. Ct. 412 (Court will not enjoin violation of license stipulation reqtiirgn
purchaser of paten. ,, achine to exact "royalty" of fixed price for "use'
by ultimate consum- ,, Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co.,
(1918) 246 U. S. 3, 38 S. Ct. 257 (resale price maintenance contract for
patented product illegal) The decisions in the last two cases were based
directly on the illegality of the provision under the anti-trust laws.
25
3See 314 U. S. at 494, cf. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes
& Smith Co., (1947) 67 S. Ct. 610, 613.
2 54
For speculation on the future influence of the decision in tls regard
see Note (1942) 51 Yale L. Jr. 1012, 1015-18. See, e.g., Vitamin Technologists
v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, (C.C.A. 9th, 1945) 146 F (2d)
941, 944-46 (suggesting that clean hands doctrine should defeat infringement
because patentee kept rickets-preventing vitamin from oleomargarine, the
"butter of the poor") , cf. Hazel-Atlas Co. v. Hartford Co., (1944) 322
U. S.238, 246, 64 S. Ct. 997 (setting aside a 1932 infringement judgment
of fraud on the patent office)
because
55
2 It appears significant that to support the reasons underlicing the
Morton Salt decision the Court cited two cases refusing to enforce resale price
maintenance devices violating the Sherman Act and other cases refusln to
give effect to analogous price maintenance schemes in patent and copyright
litigation. See cases cited supra note 252.
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thon in violation of the anti-trust laws -50 may well have influenced
later decisions which assume that the doctrine of the Morton case
applies to anti-trust violations.
The Mercoid cases, - 7 decided tvo years later, each involved a
combination patent on a heating system, the use of which was
licensed only when an unpatented device constituting an integral
part of the completed combination was obtained from the patentee
or its licensees. The Court held this arrangement violated the
anti-trust laws and under the doctrine of the Morton case barred
contributory infringement suits against parties furnishing the unpatented-device to direct infringers. In one of the cases the licensee
producers of the unpatented device were required to maintain
stipulated prices, another clear violation of the anti-trust laws.
In that case the Court concluded.
the effort here made to control competition in this unpatented device plainly violates the anti-trust laws, even apart from
the price-fixing provisions of the license agreements. It follows
that petitioner is entitled to be relieved against the consequences of
those acts3s It likewise follows that respondent may not obtain

from a court of equity any decree which directly or indirectly helps
it to subvert the public policy which underlies the grant of its
$3259
patent. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co.
The dissents in the Mid-Continent case take issue with -other ru'ing 2 60 but raise no question as to the proprie'v ,of defeating an
infringement suit when the patent is being used t,-violate the antitrust laws. Indeed, one year later the approve*
this defense in
patent infringement cases was confirmed, when Mr. Justice Roberts,

4'

2 56
See e.g. United States v. Masonite Corp., ")
316 U. S. 265,
268-70, 62 S. Ct. 1070; Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, (1945) 323
U. S. 386, 395-96, 65 S. Ct. 373, Transparent-Wrap Macb. Corp. v. Stokes &
Smith Co., (1947) 67 S. Ct. 610, 616, cf. TNEC Final Report and Recommendations, (1941) Sen. Doc. No. 35, 77 Cong. 1st Sess., 36-37
257
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., (1944) 320 U. S. 661, 64 S. Ct.
268, Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Co., (1944) 320 U. S. 680,
64 S.258Ct. 278.
This statement related to a prayer for an injunction against threatened
infringement suits and for treble damages. This relief aras later granted. See
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1944) 142 F. (2d)
549. 259
- See 320 U. S. 684.

2
6OThe division related to an issue of res judicata and to an intimation
in the opinion raising some doubt as to the future of the contributory

infringement doctrine. See 320 U. S. 674-80; Comment (1944) 42 Mich. L.
Rev. 915 (contributory infringement issue), Note (1944) 57 Harv. L. Rev.
900 (same); (1944), 44 Col. L. Rev. 447 (same), (1944) 57 Harv. L. Rev.
574 (res judicata issue), (1944) 92 U. Pa. L. Rev. 461 (same), Wood, The
Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications, (1944) 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 61.
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one of the dissenters in the Mid-Contnent case, broadly stated that
the Morton Salt and Chemical Co. cases
"apply the doctrine that, so long as the patent owner is using
his patent in violation of the anti-trust laws, he cannot restrain
'
infringement of it by others."261
The decisions actually applying the doctrine of the Morton
Salt, Checwal Co. and Mercozd cases are much narrower than this
broad language. All are based on misuse of the patent to secure a
limited monopoly on unpatented articles,2"2 or to restrain competition by protecting the patented product from legal competition
with unpatented products. 263 No case has called for a ruling on
the effect of misusing the patent to violate the anti-trust laws in
some other manner, such as for price maintenance. 20 ' but no
opinion has thrown doubt on the availability of such a defense. On
the contrary, the reference in one of the Mercozd opinions to
violation of the anti-trust laws defeating the infringement stilt
"'even apart from the price fixing provisions of the license agreements ,' 215 and the reliance in the Morton Salt opinion on the
26
lSee Hartford Empire Co. v. United States, (1945) 323 U. S. 386,
415, 65 S.Ct. 373, Notes (1945) 45 Col. L. Rev 601, (1946) 56 Yale L. Jr.
77 While approving the holding in the Morton Salt and related cases, the
Court refused to interpret those cases as authority justifying a degree in a
government anti-trust suit which in effect forfeited the patents when used
to violate the anti-trust laws. The decree which had required royalty free
licensing of all applicants was modified to require compulsory licensing at
reasonable royalties. See 323 U. S. at 413-417 The court divided four to two
on this issue, Justices Black and Rutledge dissenting, and Justices Douglas,
Murphy and Jackson not participating in the decision. Of the original majority
of four, only Justices Frankfurter and Reed are now on the bench. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the Department of Justice has not given up
and has recently urged the court to overrule the Hartford case on this issue.
See argument for United States in United States v. National Lead Co.,
No. 89-91, 1946 Term, 15 Law Week 3297 (Feb. 11, 1947) The bearing of
this aspect of the Hartford Empire case on the principle of the Morton Silt
case is considered infra note 285.
262
Sylvama Industrial Corp. v. Visking Corp.. (C.C.A. 4th 1943) 132
F (2d) 947, Landis Machinery Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., (C.C.A. 6th 1944)
141 F (2d) 800, cert. denied 323 U. S.720, 65 S.Ct. 52, Frank Adam Elec.
Co. v Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., (C.C.A. 8th, 1945) 146 F (2d) 165.
Standard Register Co. v. American Sales Book Co., (C.C.A. 2d 1945) 148
F (2d) 612, cert. denied 326 U. S.732, 66 S.Ct. 40.
26
3National Lockwasher Co. v. Garrett Co., (C.C.A. 3d 1943) 137 F
(2d) 255, cert. denied 305 U. S.649, 59 S. Ct. 243 (licensed manufacture
of patented washer only on condition that licensees did not also manufacture
non-patented competing washers)
264
The Frank Adam Elec. Co., and Sylvania Industrial Corp. cases,
supra note 262, each could have been based upon the misuse of the patent
to control prices in violation of the Sherman Act, but they appear to have
been based instead on the misuse of a patent to restrain competition with
unpatented products.
2 65
See 320 U. S. at 684 (italics supplied)
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analogy of the price maintenance cases, seem fairly to imply the
same result would be reached if the patent were used to control
prices m violation of the Sherman Act. - 6
Two questions on the application of this defense to patent infringement litigation remain. (1) May the holder of the patent
correct his misuse so as to permit subsequent judicial protection
for the patent? (2) Will the defense be available to defeat an action for damages for infringement when no equitable relief is
sought.
The first question is answered in the affirmative in the lorton
Salt and Chemical Co. opinions. There the Court stated that when
the improper use had been fully abandoned and the consequences
of that msuse fully dissipated, it would be appropriate to grant
relief from infringement. -67 The Clmiwal Co. case held, however,
that a mere expression of willingness to abandon the illegal practice, made during litigation,2 68 would not justify the granting of
relief.2 69 Certainly, unless the Court or Congress take the position
that misuse of the patent works its forfeiture, 70 the patentee should
be permitted to protect it, once the effect of discontinued abuses
has been dissipated.27 '
The second question remains open under the decisions. In all
2
66Cf. Extractol Process v. Hiram Walker & Sons, (C.C.A. 7th 1946)
153 Fed. 264, 267 Dicta in one case expressly states that an illegal price
fixing agreement would bar an infringement suit until the patentee purged
himself.
267 See Campbell v. Mueller (C.C.A. 6th 1947) 159 F (2d) 803, 806.
See 314 U. S. at 493 and 498.
26 8
0n appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals the patentee indicated a
willingness to license use of the patent without requiring use of his unpatented material. See Chemical Co. v. Ellis, (C.C.A. 1st 1941) 117 F (2d)
829, 269
837
See 314 U. S. at 498. Cf. Universal Sewer Pipe Corp. v. General
Const Co. (N.D. Ohio 1941) 42 F Supp. 132 (during course of trial
method of doing business was actually changed, the court issued an injunction against future infringement), Sylvania Industrial Corp. v. Visking
Corp., (C.C.A. 4th 1943) 132 F (2d) 947 (court holds plaintiff's "purge
was complete" 5 weeks after relief denied, and entitled to accounting for
infringement from date purge was complete), Campbell v. Mueller, (C.C.A.
6th 1947) 159 F (2d) 803 (cancellation during trial of price fixing agreeheld to "purge" prior violation).
ment270
See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, (1945) 323 U. S. 386,
415-416, 65 S. Ct. 373, considered supra note 261, and infra notes 284 and 285.
There, in refusing to hold, in effect, that patents were forfeited because
misused in violation of the anti-trust laws, the Court makes detailed reference to the fruitless attempts to secure Congressional action to accomplish
that 2result. Cf. Note (1946) 56 Yale L. Jr. 77, 116-118.
73Mere failure in the Mercoid opinions to advert to this means of avoiding permanent disqualification to protect the patent furnishes no reason to suspect a change in the Court's view, since the issue was not involved in those
cases. But see argument for United States in United States v. National
Lead Co., No. 89-91, 1946 Term, 15 Law Week 3297, 3299 (Feb. 11, 1947).
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Supreme Court cases applying the defense the prayer for an
accounting for the profits and damages 272 was denied along with the
denial of the injunction. Though the Supreme Court opinions did
not refer expressly to the denial of the prayers for an accounting,
subsequent lower court decisions held that the infringing defendant need not account for the period during which the patent was
misused .17 The result of these decisions was to deny any compensation for use of the patent while it was being misused, but
since plaintiffs had sought an injunction and accounting, basically
equitable relief, the decisions cannot be considered conclusive on
the availability of the defense when only damages are sought as in
an action at law 274
It has been suggested that a patent holder barred from equitable
relief by the doctrine of the Morton Salt case may possibly still
272

Transcript of Record, p. 3, Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., (1942)
314 U. S. 488, 62 S. Ct. 402, Transcript of Record, p. 4, B. B. Chemical Co. v.
Ellis, (1942) 314 U. S. 495, 62 S. Ct. 406, Transcript of Record, p. 4, Mercoid
Corp. v Mid-Continent Co., (1944) 320 U. S. 661, 64 S. Ct. 268, Transcript
of Record, p. 41, Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Co., (1944) 320
U. S.27680, 64 S. Ct. 278.
3Sylvama Industrial Corp. v. Visking Corp., (C.C.A. 4th, 1943) 132 F
(2d) 947, 956-57, National Lockwasher Co. v. Garrett Co., (C.C.A. 3d 1943)
137 F27 (2d) 255, cert. denied 305 U. S. 649, 59 S. Ct. 243.
4
1n these cases all actions were brought under that section of the patent
law authorizing (1) "injunctions according to the course and principles of
equity" and (2) accounting for the profits and damages "in any such case."
See (1922) 42 Stat. 392, (1940) 35 U. S. C. 70 (prior to 1946 amendment).
Due to the difficulties of ascertaining the profits in such accounting suits, this
section was amended in 1946 to authorize (1) an injunction and (2) when
not
infringement is found "in any case," damages as "due compensation
less than the reasonable royalty." See (1946) 60 Stat. at L. 778, 35 U. S. C. A.
4 70 (Supi. 1946) , (1946) Hearings before Committee on Patents on H. R.
5231, (1946) Sen. Rep. No. 1503, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., Note (1946) 56
Yale L. Jr. 77, 111 n. 88. Retained in its original form is the early provision authorizing an action for damages for infringement "by an action on the
case." See (1870) 16 Stat. at L. 207, (1940) 35 U. S. C. § 67 Prior to the
fusion of law and equity into a single civil action (Rule 2, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, (1940) 28 U S. C. A. following section 723c), an action
under the latter section would have been "at law" while one under the
former section would have been considered "in equity." Under the new rules,
a distinction is still made recognizing the purely "legal" character of the
relief sought under 35 U. S. C. 67 so as to require a jury trial on demand.
as distinct from the "equitable" character of the relief under 35 U. S. C.
70 not justifying a jury trial. Ryan Distributing Corp. v. Caley, (E.D. Pa.
1943) 51 F Supp. 377, see Beaunit Mills v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., (C.C.A.
2d 1942) 124 F (2d) 563, 565, Bellavance v. Plastic-Craft Novelty Co.,
(D. Mass. 1939) 30 F Supp. 37, 38-39. If the availability of the defense
must turn on whether the relief sought is "equitable" or "legal." an action
exclusively for damages "not less than a reasonable royalty" might well be
considered in the nature of an action at law, whether considered as brought
under 35 U. S. C. 70 without any prayer for equitable relief, or as brought
under 35 U S. C. 67 but reading the new meaning of damages into that
old section.
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be entitled to recover damages -for past infringement. 2" This
thought that the defense of patent misuse by anti-trust violation,
or monopolistic conduct falling short of such violation, is limited
to cases of equitable cognizance possibly finds support in the
opinions which repeatedly refer to withholding of relief by equity
and equity courts. 276 Further, all cases relied upon in the leading
Morton Salt opinion related to equitable relief, 277 and the principle
of the Morton Salt case has generally been considered as based
fundamentally on the equity doctrine of "unclean hands."2718 Despite these indications to the contrary, there are good reasons to
anticipate the defeat of a plaintiff seeking only damages for past
infringement during a period while he was using the patent to
violate anti-trust policy.
The underlying reason given in the Morton Salt opinion, and
recognized in subsequent cases 2 7. for denying relief when the
patent is used to violate the policy of the anti-trust and patent
laws appears to apply with as much force to an action for damages
as to a suit for an injunction. The Morton Salt opinion reasons that
a successful infringement suit will be a powerful aid in attaining
the wrongful purpose for which the patent is being used by persuading the public of its validity. s0 A court decision upholding and
enforcing the patent will have this same effect, whether it enjoins
future infringement or only enters judgment for past infringement.
The user of a patented process refusing to buy unpatent ingredients
from the patentee, or a non-cooperative competitor holding out
against a combination manipulating prices through patents, would
seem iust as likely to be coerced by a threat to collect damages for
27 5

See Notes (1946) 56 Yale L. Jr. 77, 112-16, (1945) 45 Col. L. Rev.
601, 2618.
6Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., (1942) 314 U. S. 488, passim,
62 S. Ct. 402; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., (1944) 320 U. S.
661, 670, 64 S. Ct. 268; Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honey)well Co.,
(1944) 320 U. S. 680, 684, 64 S. Ct. 278, Cf. Hartford-Empire Co. v.
United
States, (1945) 323 U. S. 386, 415, 65 S. Ct. 373.
2
77See cases cited supra notes 234, 246, 252, and mfra notes 295 and 315.
2 8
7 See Extractol Process v. Hiram Walker & Sons, (C.C.A. 7th 1946)
153 F. (2d) 264, 267, Frank Adam Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co.,
(C.C.A. 8th 1945) 146 F. (2d) 165, 167 Notes, (1946) 56 Yale L. Jr. 77.
112; (1942) 51 Yale L. Jr. 1012, 1017, Decision (1942) 42 Col. L. Rev.
882, 886. But in all four cases applying the Morton principle, the Supreme
'Court has refrained from referring to the equitable maxim or from using
the term "unclean hands," except in stating the plaintiff's argument in the
Morton Salt case. See 314 U. S. at 492.
2 9
See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., (1944) 320 U. S. 661.
670, 64 S. Ct 268, Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co,
(1947) 67 S. Ct 610, 613.
28
OSee supra pp. 555-56.
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past infringement as by a threat of injunction against future infringement. In either case, the success of the action would bring
the recalcitrant party into line, and by example would influence
others to comply with the demands of the patent holder In either
case, enforcement of the patent "rights" would furnish court aid
to a party using his patent in a manner contrary to the public
interest and thus help in accomplishment of the improper purpose.
The spectacle of the same court refusing an injunction and accounting for profits and damages because of illegal use of the
patent, and subsequently permitting an action for damages for the
same infringement occurring during the same period of illegal use
would scarcely appeal to any judge. 2 8 ' To avoid such a result, the
Court could find a ready answer to the contention that the Morton
Salt and subsequent cases only authorize the withholding of relief
by "equity" and "equity courts." All it need say is that there was
no occasion in those equity cases to go beyond the particular issues
presented, but that the same policy considerations there stressed
apply with equal force to an action for damages only It could add
that in those cases no thought was given to a "legal" action for
damages only, since full relief by accounting for profits was authorized only in the section creating an equitable action. The opinions could hardly be expected to contain a reservation making
allowance for a 1946 legislative change substituting damages "not
2 2
less than a reasonable royalty" for the old accounting for profits. "

Still, the Court could point out that even this contingency can be
brought within the terms of Mortoi Salt opinion which was not
confined to equity cases but was based expressly on a "principle
of general applicatianthat courts, and especially courts of equity ' 2
may withhold their aid when the plaintiff asserts a right contrary
to the public interest.
The ruling in the Hartford-Empire case adds further sulpport
to this view In that government anti-trust suit involving a serious
281

The same incongruity is conceivable in the analogous cases refusing
to enjoin infringement of trademarks or unfair competition because of
plaintiff's misuse of the trade-mark or trade name to misrepresent the character or origin of the product. See e.g. Manhattan Med. Co. v. Wood, (1883)

108 U. S. 218, 2 S. Ct. 436, Worden v. Calif. Fig Syrup Co., (1903) 187
U. S. 516, 23 S. Ct. 161, Derenberg, Trade Mark Protection and Unfair
Trading, (1936) 659-80. All such cases appear to have arisen in "equity,"
but if an action for damages only were brought would a court grant such
relief when it had earlier denied equitable relief? Or would the court
find that the host of equity cases had established such misuse of a trademark or trade name as a substantive defense to any action for infringement or
competition?
unfair
28
2See note 274 supra.
28

3See 214 U. S. at 492 (italics supplied)
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misuse of patents the Court authorized an injunction barring any
"recovery" -for damages for infringements which may have occurred prior to the date of the final decree. - 4 That decision seems
based on the underlying thought that a patent owner is entitled
to no relief of any kind for infringement occurring during such
misuse of the patent.2 85 After such a ruling, it is hardly likely that
the Court would permit a patentee to recover for infringement in
a private action when it is shown that the infringement occurred
while the patent was being used to violate the anti-trust laws.
TRADE-mARKS

Will the principle of the Morton Salt and Mercoid cases be
applied in the analogous fields of trade-marks and copyrights
where the same problem could easily arise?
In recent years the misuse of trade-marks to implement restraints on competition has received increased attention 280 and a
2
4See Hartford-Empire v. United States, (1945) 323 U. S. 386, 419-20,
65 S. Ct. 373. The opinion calls for an injunction against all infringenent suits
pending when the government suit was brought. It expressly provides that
the patent owner shall be "deprived of all damages and profits which it
might have claimed for past infringement" against those taking licenses
under the patents. It provides that the decree shall be without prejudice to
the future institution of suits for infringement against those not taking
licenses for infringements "arising out of their use after the date of the
decree," and that the decree shall not forbid "any defendant from seeking
recovery for infringement occurring after the date of the final decree" except
for certain patents on which compulsory licensing is required. Since the
original decree had enjoined all infringement suits until the consequences
of the anti-trust violation had been fully dissipated, the modification here
directed seems clearly to authorize a decree barring any kind of relief or
recovery for infringement occurring prior to the date of the final decree.
285
The Court's refusal in the Hartford-Empire case to approve a decree
requiring compulsory, royalty-free licensing has been characterized as contrary in principle to the Morton Salt case. See Notes (1945) 45 Col. L. Rev.
601, 618; (1946) 56 Yale L. Jr. 77, 115. Does such criticism take sufficient
account of this ruling which permits no action for infringenent occurring
prior to the correction of the improper practices by the final decree of the
court? That would seem consistent in principle with the proviso in the
Morton Salt case that enforcement of the patent would be permitted when the
improper practices had been corrected and its evil effects dissipated. See supra
p. 559. From this standpoint, the quarrel with the Hartford-Empire case would
seem more properly directed to the apparent assumption that the entry
of the final decree would dissipate the evil effects of years of repressive
and monopolistic practices. However, the evils had revolved primarily around
certain patents, and as to these the Court recognized the evil effects would
continue, for it required compulsory licensing at reasonable royalties and
infringement suits for such patents. See 323 U. S. at 417-20.
did not
2 86 authorize
See Borchardt, Aie Trademarks an Antitrust Problem, (1943) 31
Geo. L. Jr. 245; Diggins, Tradenmarks and Restraint of Trade, (1944) 32
Geo. L. Jr. 113; Callmann, The New Trade Mark Act of July 5, 1946,
(1946) 46 Col. L. Rev. 929, 944; (1944) 32 Geo. L. Jr. 171, cf. Zlinkoff,
Monopoly Versus Competition. Significant Trends in Patent, Anti-Trust,
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number of recent anti-trust prosecutions have been based on such
misuse.2- 87 The Miller-Tydings amendment in 1937 legalizing certain resale price maintenance contracts for commodities bearing the
trade-mark, brand or name of the producer 288 created tempting
opportunities to use trade-marks to give the appearance of legality
to price maintenance schemes which still violated the Sherman
Act as amended. In several recent cases trade-marks and trade
names were among the chief instrumentalities used to create effective price control in violation of the Sherman Act.2 8s The possibilities of using trade-marks to create industry-wide price control
with the appearance of legality have been graphically demonstrated.' 90 Another common practice is to use trade-marks as a
device for division of territory between otherwise potential competitors in national and international markets.2 0 1 Other methods by
which trademarks become instruments to restrain trade have been
29 2
set out in detail elsewhere.
One case in 1916212 presented the problem here posed, as to
whether misuse of a trade-mark to bring about restraint of trade
in violation of the Sherman Act may be sufficient reason to deny
protection against infringement. The Coca-Cola Company, owner
of the "Coca-Cola" trade-mark, manufactured Coca-Cola syrup
and sold it exclusively to two distributors who, with the Company's consent, divided the territory of the United States between
them. These two distributors, in turn, with the consent and approval of the Company, granted to local bottlers the exclusive right
to bottle and sell as "Coca-Cola" the beverage made from the syrup
within each bottler's restricted territory, in some instances covering
several states. Through devious channels the defendant secured
the genuine Coca-Cola syrup and bottled and sold the genuine
beverage, using the trade-mark without consent. In an action by
Trade-Mark, and Unfair Competition Suits, (1944) 53 Yale L. Jr. 514, 52852. But cf. Taggart, Trade-Marks Monopoly or Competition?, (1945) 43
Mich. L. Rev. 659.
2s7See Borchardt, supra note 286, at 251-3, Diggins, supra note 286,
at 117-31.
288See (1937) 50 Stat. at L. 693, (1940) 15 U. S. C. § 1.
2sUmted States v. Univis Lens Co., (1942) 316 U. S. 241, 62 S. Ct.
1088, United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.. (1944) 321 U. S. 707,
64 S. Ct. 805, Eastman Kodak Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C.C.A. 2d
1946) 158 F (2d) 592, cert. denied 67 S. Ct. 869; cf. Connecticut Importing
Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., (1942) 129 F (2d) 651, cert. denied
317 U.
S. 664, 63 S. Ct. 65 ("brands" rather than trade-marks involved)
29 oSee Note, (1944) 32 Geo. L. Jr. 153, 179-81.
29See Diggins, supra note 286 at 117-27, Coca Cola Co. v. Bennett,
(C.C.A.
292 8th 1916) 238 Fed. 513.
See supra note 286.
29
Coca Cola Co. v. Bennett, (C.C.A. 8th 1916) 238 Fed. 513.
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the Company to restrain this infringement of the trade-mark, the
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the alleged violation of the
Sherman Act by the series of contracts assigning exclusive terntones constituted no defense.
Would the same result be reached today in view of the decisions in the patent cases, assuming proper stress were laid on the
misuse of the trademark to restrain competition, rather than stressing the contracts themselves? Would an infringement suit be successful today if brought against an infringer when it is shown in
defense that the plaintiff is using the trade-mark to make effective
an illegal price maintenance scheme?
It would seem that the basic reasons which influenced the decision in the Morton Salt case could be applied with equal force to the
case of a trade-mark. A successful infringement suit would aid
the trade-mark owner in making its illegal purpose effective. It
would eliminate one of the most effective means of combating the
illegal scheme by restraining the competitive use of the trade-mark
by those refusing to participate in the scheme. Whether the scheme
be exclusive division of markets, or some form of price fixing, the
existence of non-cooperative competition in the very trade-mark
itself would go a long way toward defeating the illegal practice.
To restrain such competition, however flagrant the infringement
might be, .would place the stamp of judicial approval on the trademark, and thus give support to the scheme itself. The "general
principle" enunciated in the Morton Salt case that courts, and
especially courts of equity, will withhold relief when the plaintiff
is using a right contrary to the public interest would seem directly
applicable to this situation.
Two authorities relied upon in the Morton Salt opinion give
added support to the belief that this defense may be recognized in
a proper trade-mark case. In support of its decision that misuse
of a patent contrary to the public interest justifies denial of court
aid, the Court relied 94 uporn its two leading decisions holding that
equity will deny relief for trade-mark infringement when plaintiff
misuses the trade-mark to misrepresent the character or origin of
his product.2 95 Misuse of a trade-mark to bring about illegal restraint of trade would seem even more detrimental to the public
interest and, therefore, to provide a sound reason for denying
court aid while the misuse continues.
294 See 314 U. S. at 494.

295
Manhattan Mfed. Co. v. Wood, (1883) 108 U. S.218, 2 S. Ct. 436
(origin), Worden v. Calif. Fig Syrup Co., (1903) 187 U. S.516, 23 S. Ct.
161 (character) ; see Derenberg, op. cit. supra note 281 at 659-80.
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This problem has been complicated by the Trade Mark Act
of 1946.296 Section 33(b) of that act makes five years continuous
use of a mark after registration conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark on the goods specified
except when one of the following defenses or defects is
established.
(7) That the mark has been or 297
is being used to violate the
anti-trust laws of the United States.

This seventh defense was inserted in the bill by the Senate after
it had passed the House of Representatves, 298 and was accepted
29

by the conference committee.

At the very least this subsection 7 means that use of the mark
to bring about an anti-trust violation will deprive the registrant
of the advantage of incontestability ordinarily resulting from five
year's use after registration, 0 0 and throw him under Section 33 (a)
which makes registration only prima facie evidence of the exclusive
right, subject to "all legal and equitable defenses" available without
registration. In explaining the conference report, this restrictive
meaning was attributed to the amendment by Representative Lanham, the original sponsor of the bill in the House. 801 At least on
the surface it is the logical interpretation, since subsection 7 is
formally an exception only to Section 33(b) On the other hand,
both the original report of the Senate Committee recommending the
change, 30 2 and Senator O'Mahoney's subsequent explanation of

the change in rebuttal 3 3 of Representative Lanham's remarks,
points to a different understanding among the Senate backers of the
296(1946) 60 Stat. at L. 427, 15 U. S. C. A. § 1051-1127 (Supp. 1946)
The Act becomes effective July 5, 1947 See Callmann, supra note 286, Diggins,2 The
Lanham Trade Mark Act, (1947) 35 Geo. L. J. 147
9
7See 15 U. S. C. A. 1115(b) (Supp. 1946).
2 98
See (1946) Sen. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong. 2d Sess.
2 99
See (1946) 92 Cong. Rec. 7522-23. A minor modification was nrade
substituting "use to violate" in place of "use in violation of." The purpose of
the change was to require a clear causal relation between the use of the trademark and the anti-trust violation. See (1946) 92 Cong. Rec. 7873-4, 7524-5,
Diggins,
supra note 286 at 194.
30
oIt will be noted that this "defense" applies to past misuse ("has been")
as well as to present misuse of the mark, and in that respect is broader than
the Morton Salt case which would permit protection of a patent after the
misuse
30 is discontinued and its effects dissipated. See supra p. 559.
See (1946) 92 Cong. Rec. 7524-25.
30
2See (1946) Sen. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 "It is made
a defense to a suit on a mark if the mark is used in violation of the antitrust303
laws."
The Senator's comments on this point were prefaced by the remark
that he "felt there might be some misinterpretation of the language employed by one of the Members of the House in attempting to explain the
Senate amendment." (1946) 92 Cong. Rec. 7872.
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bill who were responsible for subsection (7). According to the
Senator, it was intended that use of a trade-mark to violate the
anti-trust laws should not only make the mark contestable but
should constitute a defense to all infringement suits. 04 Such conflicting statements of intent, possibly aimed at influencing subsequent interpretation,30 5 can be of little aid to the Court.
The act itself, however, provides considerable support for Senator O'Mahoney's interpretation of Section 33 (b) (7) Despite
the formal organization which makes the seven defenses appear
only as exceptions to the conclusive evidence provision, the term
"defenses or defects" suggests a broader intent. Examination of the
other six "defenses" reveals that each is of a character which would
completely defeat any infringement action under the act.300 From
the character of these defenses the Court could readily conclude
that paragraphs (1) to (7) were intended to specify those defenses
which should always be available in all infringement actions,
even against a claim of incontestability 307 This would harmonize
with the organization of the entire section on the theory that 33 (a)
made registration for less than five years only "prima facie evi304
have been
See id. at 7872-73. "Trade-marks from time to time
felt that under the
used in violation of the anti-trust laws. It was
language of -the bill trade names could be used to prolong a patent monopoly
after expiration of the patent. One of the Senate amendments, agreed to
with slight modification by the House, was intended to eliminate this posstbility. . Mr. President, the point I wish to make perfectly clear is that
use of such a mark to violate the anti-trust laws, constitutes a defense to
an infringement suit. . It is of such importance to the public of the United
States that restraint of trade should not be permitted, that the Senate inserted
this amendment to make it a defense to an infringement suit as well as to
make it a ground of contestability if it should be shown that the registrant
was using the mark in violation of the anti-trust law."
3O5Representative Lanham's remarks were made "in order that its intermay be made dear." See id at 7524. See also miupra note 303.
pretation
30
GThe first three defenses (1) fraud in obtaining registration (2) abandonnent, and (3) assignment and use of the mark so as to misrepresent
the source of the goods were a complete defense under the old act. See (1905)
33 Stat. at L. 729, 15 U. S. C. 101. The new act expressly makes them
a ground for cancellation of the registration at any time. See Sec. 14 (c).
The second and third are a defense under common law rules. See Derenberg,
op. cit. supra note 281 at 598, 659. The new act's more liberal view toward
registration of personal names and descriptive and geographic ternis, when
not used primarily in that sense, (Sec. 2(c), (e)) made necessary the fourth
defense. This permits defendant, charged with infringement, to show that
the term was used as his individual name in his own business or used in good
faith to describe commodities or their geographic origin. Such defense is
obviously intended to be available prior to expiration of the five year contestable period as well as afterward. The fifth and sixth defenses recognize
prior use as a defense within the limited area in which such prior use was
proven, despite the expiration of the five year contestibility period. Section
times.
15 makes
307 the mark contestible to this extent at all
But cf. (1946) 92 Cong. Rec. 7524 where Representative Lanham
states all seven "defenses" are intended only to defeat incontestability.
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dence" of the exclusive right to the mark subject to "any legal
or equitable defense or defect," whereas 33(b) made registration
for more than five years "conclusive evidence" of the exclusive
right, subject to certain limited defenses which should always be
available to defeat a claim of infringement. It is reasonable to
conclude that the less favored trade-marks under 33(a) were intended to be subject to all defenses available against the more
favored trade-marks under 33 (b)
This latter interpretation would not only appear justifiable as
a matter of statutory interpretation, but would be consistent with
the principle of the Morton Salt case as applied to trade-marks. If
the more restrictive view of Section 33(b) (7) is taken, it would
still be possible for the Court to apply the principle of the Morion
Salt case as a "legal or equitable defense" under 33(a), though
it would likely not do so if it concludes that Congress intended
misuse to defeat only the incontestability of the mark.108
COPYRIGHTS

Substantially the same problem could arise in connection with
misuse of copyrights to violate the anti-trust laws. The most obvious example is the operation of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (Ascap) before the 1941 settlement of the government anti-trust injunction suit by a consent
decree 3 9 and the criminal prosecution by a plea of nolle contendere
and a fine.310 Prior to the consent decree, the Ascap practices alleged to violate the anti-trust laws were molded around the licensing of musical copyrights for public performance. 811 Other methods
of misusing copyrights to violate the anti-trust acts are readily
conceivable, such as sale of books by the copyright owner only
upon agreement of the buyer to maintain stipulated resale prices. 12
3o8Cf. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., (1947)

noted30supra
p. 543.
9

67 S. Ct. 1015, as

See (1941)
9 U. S. Law Week 2514-15, where the decree is
summarized.
31OSee (1941) 9 U. S. Law Week 2548. A total of $35,750 in fines
was imposed.
3liThe Ascap practices, and the anti-trust problems raised, are well
considered in Cohn, Music, Radio Broadcasters and the Sherman Act,
(1941) 29 Geo. L. Jr. 407
a12Cf. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, (1908) 210 U. S. 339, 28 S. Ct.
722, holding that it was not copyright infringement for dealer to resell a book
for less than the price at which dealer was "licensed" to resell it. It may
well be questioned whether any copyrighted book is "in free and open
competition with commodities of the same general class" so as to bring such
an agreement within the protection of the Miller Tydings amendment. Cf.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Federal Trade Commission (C. C. A. 2d 1946)
158 F (2d) 592, cert. denied (1947) 67 S. Ct. 869.
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Or by the "block-booking" device the distributor of a copyrighted
motion picture film may license its exhibition only on condition
31 3
that the licensee also contract to exhibit certain of its other films.
In cases of that character, should the copyright owner be entitled
to court aid to enforce the copyright against inf ringers, thus making
his scheme more effective?
In the past the lower courts unanimously ruled that violation of
the anti-trust laws by Ascap would not constitute a defense to
infringement. These cases all preceded the Mortn Salt decision,
and their standing might very well be questioned in the light of
that case. It would seem that whenever the copyright is used to
make effective an arrangement which violates the anti-trust laws,
substantially the same reasoning developed in the Morton Salt
case, and applied above to the case of trade-marks, could be urged
31
with equal force to defeat a copyright infringement suit. '
As in the case of trade-marks, the clean hands doctrine has
heretofore been invoked to deny relief from copyright infringement when the copyright was being misused in such a manner as
to deceive the public.3 1 5 In the Morton Salt opinion the Court
31 6
relied on that holding as analogous to the misuse of a patent.
Misuse of a copyright to violate the anti-trust laws would seem
even more harmful to the public interest than its misuse in a
deceptive manner, and hence to be within the principle of the
Morton Salt case.

317

313Such block booking was recently held to violate the Sherman Act
by a three-judge District Court, United States v. Paramount Pictures (S. D.
N. Y. 1946) 66 F Supp. 323. But cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Paramount
Famous-Lasky Corp., (C.C.A. 2d 1932) 57 F. (2d) 152.
31&Both in the case of trade-marks and copyrights, availability of the
defense m "law" as well as in "equity" would present problems similar
to those considered in connection with patents. See supra pp. 559-63. In view
of the liquidated damages available for copyright infringement [(1912) 37
Stat. 489, (1940) 17 U. S. C. § 25 (b)] and the non-repetitive nature of
many such infringements, actions for damages only will be more frequent
m copyright cases than in trade-mark cases where plaintiff's primary
concern will be to protect his mark against future infringement by injunction.
315Stone & M'Carrick v. Dugan Piano Co., (C. C. A. 5th 1915) 220
Fed. 837.
3' 6 See 314 U. S. at 494.
3 17
Pecent lower court decisions could be invoked to support this
position. Circuit Judge Augustus N. Hand has intimated that the principle
of the Mercoid and Morton Salt cases should apply to misuse of a copyright
to extend its monopoly beyond that granted through block-booking of films
and analogous devices. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, (S.D.
N.Y. 1946) 66 F Supp. 323, 348-49. Violation of the anti-trust laws by
Ascap was held to create "unclean hands" so as to bar Ascap from the
equitable relief it sought against enforcement of a restrictive state statute
alleged to interfere with Congressional authority over copyrights. Buck
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CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE FUTURE SCOPE
OF THE DEFENSE

While the outlines of the defense have been marked in tile decided cases, problems as to its scope will continue to arise in cases
for which the Supreme Court decisions provide no certain guide.
It is proposed in conclusion to suggest a few of the considerations
which should be weighed in making future decisions, whether
judicial or legislative.
It is suggested that in determining the availability of the defense for any particular class of case the need and value of the
defense in making Congressional policy effective should be weighed
against the injustices and procedural difficulties which might be
caused by its application.
Is there any genuine need for the defense in enforcing the Congressional policy embodied in the anti-trust acts? This resolves itself into two related questions (1) Are the present sanctions provided by the anti-trust acts adequate? (2) If not, will recognition of
this defense provide any substantial assistance in making Congressional policy effective?
The answer to the first question must be an emphatic negative. The inadequacy of all remedies, public and private, were developed in detail in the monographs, proceedings and recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Committee"' whose
recommendations for improvements have not been adopted by
Congress. 31 9' The inadequacy of the treble damage remedy,"'

either as compensation to the injured private party or as a deterrent
to the violator, is graphically demonstrated by its history revealv. Gallagher, (W.D. Wash. 1940) 36 F Supp. 405, Note (1941) 50 Yale
L. Jr. 1114. To bar an action for copyright infringement on the same ground
would seem less drastic.
3' 8 See Hamilton and Till, Antitrust in Action, [TNEC Monograph
No. 16], (1940) 75-85, (1939) TNEC Preliminary Report, Sen. Doc. No. 95.
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-20, 4 Proceedings of TNEC 642-44, (1941) TNEC
Final Report, Sen. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, 137-38, cf. Note,
Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforcement (1939) 49 Yale L. Jr. 284.
3lSThe recommendation for severe civil penalties was embodied in a
bill introduced by Senator O'Mahoney. See (1939) S. 2719, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess., (1939) 84 Cong. Rec. 8191-2. Brief Committee hearings were
held on the bill but it died in committee. See (1939) Hearings Before a
Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2719.
76th Cong. 1st Sess.
32OSee Hamilton and Till, op. cit. supra note 318 at 82-85, cf. Note
(1939) 49 Yale L. Jr. 284, 296-99; Donovan and Irvine, Proof of Damages
under the Anti-Trust Law, (1940) 88 U. Pa. L. Rev. 511, 524-26.
3-°See Note (1939) 49 Yale L. Jr. 284, 298, cf. Donovan and Irvine,
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ing an average at best of one successful case per year for the first
fifty years of the Sherman Act.32
The crucial question is the second: Will recognition of the defense be of any real value in enforcing Congressional policy?
That should depend, in part, upon whether the reasons for failure
of the treble damage action as an effective sanction would likewise render ineffectual the defense of illegality. Three reasons are
suggested as major factors in the failure of the treble damage
remedy: (1) The difficulty and impossibility in many cases of
proving the damages caused by anti-trust violations due to the
innumerable factors entering into business losses and failures.3-(2) Proof of the anti-trust violation against a strongly entrenched,
well financed defendant often entails financial and legal burdens beyond the capacity of any litigant except the government itself. 3(3) In many cases the private party will' refrain from challenging
an anti-trust violation because he fears the loss of business ad4
vantage or possible trade reprisals if he breaks with the violator.3'
The defense would relieve the victim of the difficulties involved
in establishing damages, but in many instances the second and third
reasons outlined above would handicap the usefulness of the defense in substantially the same degree and manner as they handicap the treble damage remedy. Proof of the violation would seem
equally difficult whether on the offensive or the defensive, and
refusal to pay for goods purchased not only invites reprisals and
loss of business advantage with the seller but involves the added
threat of harm to the credit rating generally The probable effect
of these factors seems reflected in the scanty use of the defense
in those states which expressly make violation of their local antitrust laws a complete defense to an action for the price of goods
sold by the violator. -5
However, many cases will arise not presenting these difficulties
which beset the treble damage action. Possibly the clearest of these
is the patent infringement suit by one who has misused the patent
supra note 320 at 525-26: Notes (1932) 32 Col. L. Rev. 335, 336; (1946)
41 Ill.22L. Rev. 462 n. 2.
See Hamilton and Till, op. cit. supra note 318 at 83-84, Donovan and
Irvine, supra note 320; cf. Note (1946) 41 Ill. L. Rev. 462.
3-See Hamilton and Till, op. cit. supra note 318 at 82-83; Note (1939)
49 Yale L. Jr. 284, 296-98; and see references cited supra note 25.
32
4Cf. (1939) 49 Yale L. Jr. 284, 296.
a2 This inference is drawn from the very few reported cases under
such statutes. In some states there are none. See supra note 21 for reference
to the326statutes involved.
Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, (S.D. N.Y. 1931) 53 F (2d) 112.
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to violate the anti-trust laws. The infringer is not dependent upon
the patentee's good will and will not hesitate to challenge him, in
fact, he has already done so or no infringement suit would have
been brought. In most such cases, the misuse of the patent can be
established without imposing difficult or impossible burdens on
the defendant. Copyright and trade-mark cases present similar
opportunities for effective use of the defense as do those cases in
which a price-fixing license contract is challenged on the basis of
the patent's invalidity Contract cases can readily arise in which
proof of the violation is relatively simple and the defendant has
nothing to lose by challenging the alleged violator. For example, in
a lower federal court a defendant who had sold his business to
plaintiff sought to avoid enforcement of an ancillary agreement not
to compete on the ground that it was part of a general plan by which
plaintiff sought a monopoly in an interstate area in violation of the
Sherman Act. 32 6 In many such cases of infinite variety the treble

damage action would be of doubtful value because of the requirement of provable damages, but the defense of illegality would serve
a useful purpose, both by refusing judicial aid in the accomplishment of the illegal design and by bringing about the correction
of illegal practices.

27

Even when the defense would normally involve the third factor mentioned above, it will occasionally be asserted when the
defendant is already at odds with the plaintiff.3 28 Though such
cases may not be great in number, the defense has value as one
means by which the Court, in the particular case before it, can
prevent an anti-trust violator from accomplishing his purpose by
refusing any judicial aid to that end. In such a case the Court
would be serving, to a lesser degree, the same function it performs
326Stanley Co. v. Lagomarsino, (S.D. N.Y. 1931) 53 F (2d) 112.
The court rejected the defense apparently on the ground that the alleged
illegality was "collateral" as it did not appear on the face of the contract.
Cf. Camors-McConnell Co. v. McConnell, (C.C. Ala. 1905) 140 Fed. 412
(accord) But cf. American & British Mfg. Co. v. New Idria Quicksilver
Co., (C.C.A. 1st, 1923) 293 Fed. 509 (knowledge of buyer's purpose

to secure corner on quicksilver market held to bar seller in action for

breach of contract to buy), Brent v. Gay, (1912) 149 Ky. 656, 149 S. W 915.
327Not only have the practices been corrected in particular cases
when misuse of patents was invoked as a defense (see supra note 269),
but the threat of defeat in infringement suits appears to be causing industry
to realize the necessity of modifying its practices. See Bateman, Should
Anti-Trust Law Penalties or Unenforceability of the Patent Monopoly Be
Invoked for Misuse of the Patent Grant, (1947) 29 Jr. Pat. Off. Soc.
16, 65-7
32
8For example, in the Connolly, Wall Paper and Wilder cases buyers
asserted the defense against their suppliers.
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when it enjoins the violation in a suit instituted by the government.
Are there countervailing considerations which should outweigh
this limited value of defense in the enforcement of Congressional
policy?
One criterion suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson in weighing
the defense as a sanction in the Bruce's Juices case was whether it
was a "rational, nondiscriminatory and appropriate means of
making the policy of the statute effective. To allow a buyer to
get his goods for nothing because the seller violated the Act by
giving someone else a greater discount, does not meet this test.11" 0'The inappropriateness of permitting a person to get something for
nothing has continuously reasserted itself as a factor in the history
of the defense as applied to the anti-trust laws. 330 While a windfall
to the defendant has not been sufficient to bar the defense against
enforcement of a contract inherently illegal, 33 ' the windfall factor
has doubtless been important in keeping the defense within fairly
narrow bounds. It should be recognized, however, that this consideration has no merit or weight as applied to contracts executory
on both sides, or requiring action which will make monopolistic
plans effective. Indeed, it would seem that judicial refusal to enforce an executory contract at an illegally rigged price, or an
ancillary agreement not to compete when it is one of several
designed to monopolize a business, or to enjoin infringement of a
patent being used to violate the law, is-a most rational and appropriate means of making the statutory policy effective.
The procedural burdens of transforming a simple suit involving
private rights into a complicated anti-trust trial, with the tremendous volume of evidence sometimes required, has been adverted
to earlier as one consideration which may possibly have influenced
the Court in past decisions. 3 2 Though no Supreme Court opinion
has expressly relied upon this factor, it might be thought significant that none of the cases recogmzing the defense have involved
such burdens. In all of them the violation plainly appeared or was
apparently susceptible of ready proof, but the same could be said
of those cases in which the Supreme Court rejected the defense.
The character of those cases in which the defense has been attempted
suggests that the importance of this factor can easily be exag67 S. Ct. at 1019.
supra pp. 520. 521, 523, 528.
supra p. 523.
See pp. 520, 529 supra.

3
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332 See
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gerated. While cases are conceivable in which the anti-trust issue
would impose an undue burden on the court, out of all proportion
to the value of the defense as a sanction, such cases are most unlikely because the financial burden upon the defendant to establish
the defense would also be out of all proportion to the value he
would derive from it. When proof of the violation would require the
extensive and expensive investigation and litigation involved in
many government anti-trust actions, no private litigant could or
would undertake it except possibly in a treble damage action
333
promising large returns.
The weight which should be given to these and other competing
factors will vary with the character of the private right against
which the defense is asserted, the general type of violation alleged,
the legislative history of the particular statute involved, and the
adequacy of its remedies for that type of violation. That such
factors will at least be considered seems probable. The Supreme
Court's latest word on the defense encourages the belief that in
deciding future problems concerning its scope increased attention
will be given to such underlying policy considerations and less to
the artificial labeling of transactions as collateral or inherently
illegal.
333
1n case Congress should look with favor on the defense, as in the

case of trade-marks, its effective scope could be increased without greatly
increasing the judicial burden by amending Section 5 of the Clayton Act to
permit judgments in government suits and prosecutions to be used as
prima facie evidence of the violation there established when violation is
placed in issue as a defense. See (1914) 38 Stat. 731, (1940) 15 U. S. C.
16. Section 5 would be far more effective if the judgment were made
conclusive evidence oi the violation as originally proposed. See supra note
28. Making it prim. facie evidence has permitted the reopening of the
entire issue and defeated to some extent the original purpose. See Hamilton
and Till, op. cit. supra note 318 at 83. Doubts were raised in Congress as
to the constitutionalicy of giving conclusive effect to the judgment. See
(1914) Sen. Rep. No 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 45, (1914) 51 Cong. Rec.
13849-58 These doubts failed to distinguish between making one fact
conclusive evidence of another and making a judgment conclusive evidence
of the facts adjudicated therein when used against a party who has already
had his day in court on those issues. Cf. Morgan, Federal Constitutional
Limitations Upon Presumptions Created by State Legislation, Harvard
Legal Essays (1934) 323.

